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ABSTRACT
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that Mexico is about to
initiate with the U.S. and Canada has the purpose to gradually reduce tariff and non-tariff
barriers between the three countries. The implementation of NAFTA will create the
largest trading region in the world, with 360 million consumers and a joint GNP
exceeding $6 trillion.
NAFTA also seems likely to include provisions incorporating foreign investment and
the movement of labor and services. Experience in the European Community (EC)
suggests that less-developed economies benefit from associating with a more developed
trading bloc.
Mexico's key objectives in NAFTA are productive efficiency and economies of
scale, access to cheaper products, increased exports, increased employment, stimulated
domestic and foreign investment and technology transfer.
A combination of easier access to the U.S. and Canadian markets and the possibility
of acquiring intermediate materials and capital goods from abroad at the best prices, in
the same way that Mexico boasts the advantage of low production costs, will allow the
traditional exporting sectors to improve their competitiveness, as well as promote new
activities linked to the international market.
The Mexican construction industry, representing approximately 5% of the GNP, will
face the major challenge in its history. It will compete directly with U.S. and Canadian
construction firms in a market that is considered the most competitive in the world.
The purpose of this thesis is to review how NAFTA affects the Mexican construction
industry and the challenges and opportunities that mexican construction companies will
confront with its implementation.
Thesis supervisor: Fred Moavenzadeh
Title: Director, Center for Construction Research and Education
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Overview.
The Mexican construction industry is facing one of the major challenges in its
history: the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that
will encompass the economies of Mexico, the United States, and Canada.
NAFTA aims to gradually reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers between the three
countries. The implementation of NAFTA will create the largest trading region in the
world, with 360 million consumers and a combined GNP exceeding $6 trillion. NAFTA
also includes provisions covering foreign investment and the movement of labor and
services. Experience in the European Economic Community (EEC) suggests that less-
developed economies benefit from association with a more developed trading bloc. Thus,
Mexico's key objectives in NAFTA are to gain productive efficiency and economies of
scale, access to cheaper products, increased exports, increased employment, stimulated
domestic and foreign investment and technology transfer.
A combination of easier access to US and Canadian markets and the possibility of
acquiring intermediate materials and capital goods from abroad at the best prices, in the
same way that Mexico boasts the advantage of low production costs, will allow the
traditional exporting sectors to improve their competitiveness, as well as promote new
activities linked to the international market. 1
1 Leaders:The Investment Guide to Mexico, October-November-December 1991, Special Supplement
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The Mexican construction industry, representing approximately 5% of Mexico's
GNP, will face the major challenge of its history. It will compete directly with U.S. and
Canadian construction firms in a market that is considered the most competitive in the
world.
1.2 The Mexican Construction Industry.
The Mexican construction industry traditionally has represented approximately 5%
of the GNP, as shown in Table 1.1. Similar to the rest of the world, the construction
industry in Mexico is very fragmented. In 1991 it was composed of 18,006 firms
affiliated with the Cimara Nacional de la Industria de la Construcci6n or CNIC
(Construction Industry National Chamber). Compare this to 15,982 companies in 1990.
This 13% increase in the number of firms from 1990 to 1991 is almost three times the
increase from 1989 to 1990. It is important to mention that the statistical data available
for this industry comes mainly from CNIC. Thus, the informal construction sector,
composed mainly of individual laborers and jobbers as well as some unregistered small
construction firms, escapes most legal regulation and statistical enumeration, even though
it represents a very important volume of the total construction put in place.
Table 1.2 shows the volume of construction performed by the firms affiliated with
CNIC during the 1980's. It can be seen that the year of highest production was 1981 and
that level of construction has not been achieved subsequently.
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Table 1.1: Breakdown of the Mexican GNP
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Real G.N.P. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
PRIMARY SECTOR 8.4 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.2 7.6 7.5
Agriculture, livestockfishing 8.4 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.2 7.6 7.5
SECONDARY SECTOR 30.7 31.1 31.8 31.1 31.6 31.9 32.6 33.1
Mining 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.6
Manufacturing 20.4 20.7 21.4 21.0 21.3 21.7 22.5 22.8
Construction 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.2
Energy and water 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5
TERTIARY SECTOR 60.8 60.6 59.8 60.3 62.6 62.7 62.6 62.2
Commerce, restaurants, and hotels 27.4 27.1 26.7 25.9 25.5 25.6 25.8 25.8
Transportation and communications 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.7
Finance and insurance 9.6 9.8 9.9 10.7 10.8 10.9 10.9 10.7
Community, social, and personal services 19.0 18.8 18.3 18.8 18.5 18.4 18.0 17.6
BANKING SERVICES (1.3) (1.3) (1.3) (1.4) 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Source: Realidad Economica de Mexico 1992, Compendio Estadistico, Grupo Editorial Iberoamerica
It can be clearly seen that the decline in the construction production began with the
decline of the general economy that started with the oil crisis of 1981. The most dramatic
decrease was in 1988. It can be argued that the lack of confidence for private investment
during 1988 was worsened by fears of political instability. This was the year when the
most contested presidential elections in Mexico's history took place.
Another important characteristic of the Mexican construction industry is the
geographical concentration of its activities. Table 1.3 shows the number of firms
registered in each state and the production per state.
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Table 1.2: Total Production Value of Firms Incorporated to CNIC
Nominal
Mill. current pesos
250,694
446,276
506,917
643,900
1,174,376
1,755,671
2,541,882
6,327,157
6,593,754
10,897,111
17,568,396
27,585,930
Real
Mill. constant pesos
250,694
344,083
253,458
181,944
211,142
202,733
165,229
170,350
82,893
128,150
165,415
226,793
% Growth,Nominal
previous year
78.01
13.58
27.02
82.38
49.49
44.78
148.91
4.21
65.26
61.22
57.02
% Growth, Real
previous year
37.25
-26.33
-28.21
16.04
-3.98
-18.49
3.09
-51.33
54.59
29.07
37.11
Source: Revista Mexicana de la Construccion, No. 455, December 1992
The geographical concentration of the industry can be easily perceived. Just in the
Distrito Federal, that accounts for most of Mexico City's metropolitan area, we can find
31 percent of the registered construction firms and 15.47 percent of the production. More
than 45 percent of the construction production and more than 50 percent of the number of
construction firms is distributed in six states: Distrito Federal, Veracruz, Jalisco, Hidalgo,
Nuevo Leon, and Campeche. One reason for this may be the demographic distribution
since these six states account for 25.2 million inhabitants or 30 percent of the total
population in Mexico (81 million in 1990).2
2 Censo de Poblacidn y Vivienda; INEGI; 1990
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
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Table 1.3: Geographic Distribution of the Construction Industry in Mexico (1991
State
Aguascalientes
Baja California
Baja California Sur
Campeche
Coahuila
Colima
Chiapas
Chihuahua
Distrito Federal
Durango
Estado de Mexico
Guanajuato
Guerrero
Hidalgo
Jalisco
Michoacan
Morelos
Nayarit
Nuevo Leon
Oaxaca
Puebla
Queretaro
Quintana Roo
San Luis Potosi
Sinaloa
Sonora
No. of firms
registered in
219
464
117
215
639
132
400
427
5,587
150
328
489
199
97
1,120
428
159
162
1,066
297
445
193
157
493
474
462
CNIC
1.22
2.58
0.65
1.19
3.55
0.73
2.22
2.37
31.03
0.83
1.82
2.72
1.11
0.54
6.22
2.38
0.88
0.90
5.92
1.65
2.47
1.07
0.87
2.74
2.63
2.57
Production
(mill. pesos)
631,718
361,376
226,205
1,434,468
926,887
358,617
604,132
976,542
4,267,544
237,239
982,059
703,441
419,306
1,693,776
1,875,843
631,718
962,749
154,481
1,445,503
766,889
579,305
408,272
449,651
463,444
769,647
725,510
2.29
1.31
0.82
5.20
3.36
1.30
2.19
3.54
15.47
0.86
3.56
2.55
1.52
6.14
6.80
2.29
3.49
0.56
5.24
2.78
2.10
1.48
1.63
1.68
2.79
2.63
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Table 1.3 (continued)
Tabasco 717 3.98 910,336 3.30
Tamaulipas 573 3.18 761,372 2.76
Tlaxcala 79 0.44 168,274 0.61
Veracruz 1,095 6.08 2,038,600 7.39
Yucatan 437 2.43 479,995 1.74
Zacatecas 186 1.03 171,033 0.62
TOTAL 18,006 100.00 27,585,931 100.00
source: Revista Mexicana de la Construccion, No. 455, December 1992
1.2.1: Supply of Construction.
As stated before, the Mexican construction industry is composed of 18,006 firms in
its formal sector. These firms vary in size, 95% of them being medium and small firms
and only 5% being large (see Table 1.5). Despite this, the large (giant and big)
construction companies produce 60% of the total construction output.
The criteria used by CNIC to classify the construction companies according to their
size appears in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: Size Classification Criteria for Construction Firms (million
pesos 1991)
SIZE
Small Medium Big Giant
REVENUES
(million pesos) 0-875 876-5,250 5,251-12,500 12,501 or more
Source: Revista Mexicana de la Construccion, No. 455, December 1992
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Table 1.5 presents the production of construction by company size in 1991.
Table 1.5: Total Value of Production of Firms Affiliated with CNIC by
Size, 1991.
Size No. firms % Production %
(mill. pesos)
Giant 313 1.74 12,639,874 45.82
Big 508 2.82 3,950,305 14.32
Medium 2,760 15.33 5,817,873 21.09
Small 14,425 80.11 5,177,879 18.77
TOTAL 18,006 100.00 27,585,931 100.00
Source: Revista Mexicana de la Construccion, No. 455, December 1992
It can be seen that more than 60% of the production is shared between giant and big
firms. The small firms' share in production decreased from 52.22% in 1989 to 39.72% in
1990, and to 18.77% in 1991. Thus, the small firms' share of construction production is
decreasing dramatically. This market share is being absorbed mainly by giant firms
whose share increased from 28.58% in 1990 to 45.82% in 1991, an amount proximate to
the 21% decrease in small firms' share. There is a trend of the construction market in
Mexico to be mainly overtaken by large firms.
Table 1.6 shows the composition of the production of Mexican construction firms in
different segments of the construction market.
-14-
Table 1.6: Composition of Production of Construction Firms by
Specialty (1981-1991)
Specialty 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Building and Housing 11.4 28.6 14.6 25.9 26.7 27.2 17.8 37.2 26.2 41.0 23.9
Industrial Construction 17.4 19.2 16.8 24.3 18.6 11.4 7.7 10.6 11.31 9.7 12.8
Heavy Construction 7.3 7.8 16.01 15.3 14.2 16.3 12.3 11.7 19.23 23.8 30.5
Installations 8.9 9.3 4.4 6.7 9.0 8.4 6.8 9.9 12.08 8.3 7.1
Professional Services 3.7 6.6 4.1 5.2 4.4 5.2 4.7 3.9 3.55 4.4 4.2
Diversified 51.3 28.5 44.1 22.6 27.1 31.5 50.7 26.7 27.65 12.8 21.5
Source: Revista Mexicana de la Construccion, No. 455, December 1992
The big growth in the number of firms dedicated to heavy construction
(transportation, power, and water) may be a consequence of the increased investment by
the public sector in infrastructure, from 14.4 trillion pesos in 1989 to 16.2 trillion pesos
in 1990.
1.2.1.1 Employment:
As mentioned earlier, the informal sector of the construction industry in Mexico
probably represents a higher figure in total output and number of employed persons than
the formal sector. It is very difficult to track all the jobbers and laborers that work for a
living in some sort of construction: from the construction of a dwelling in a slum to the
maintenance and renovation of houses in most middle-class neighborhoods. Although
this production does not figure in the official statistics of construction output, it is
reflected in the sales volume of materials for construction.
A key characteristic of employment in the construction sector is its instability. Most
of the personnel working on construction sites do it just for the duration of the project or
even less. A construction firm usually maintains as permanent human resources just the
-15 -
office personnel, some engineers and technicians, and some foremen. Most of the
"operating core" 3 (operating engineers, carpenters, ironworkers, helpers, etc.) shift from
one job to another, usually moving from firm to firm, and even from one geographic area
to another. Some other laborers live mainly for agriculture and abandon construction
work during harvest time Therefore they see construction as an alternative activity and
focus on it for only a few months each year. This labor instability is an important reason
why Mexican construction firms invest very little in training and human resource
development.
During 1991, the Mexican construction firms affiliated with CNIC reported an
average of 98,589 employees in the office and 349,545 employees on the jobsite,
representing 22% and 78% of the total workforce, respectively. Table 1.7 displays the
number and percentage of total employed personnel during 1991.
Table 1.7: Employed Personnel by Firms Affiliated with CNIC During
1991 (average)
CLASIFICATION Total % Permanent % Eventual %
Blue collar 349,545 78.00 67,781 45.38 281,764 94.30
White collar 98,589 22.00 81,572 54.62 17,017 5.70
TOTAL 448,134 100.00 149,353 100.00 298,781 100.00
Source: Revista Mexicana de la Construccion, No. 455, December 1992
3The "operating core" is the part of the organization wherein the operators carry out the basic work of the
organization - the input, processing, output, and direct support tasks associated with producing the products
or services. The definition is taken from: Mintzberg, Henry; "The Structuring of Organizations"; Prentice
Hall; 1979
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Main problems affecting Mexican construction firms:
A poll taken by CNIC of 300 construction companies indicates that the main
problems they have to face vary depending on the size of the firm. Table 1.8 shows the
problems and the percentage of firms that indicated this problem as the most critical one
for them.
Table 1.8: Main Problems Affecting the Construction Firms by Size
during 1991
Problem Percentage by size
Small Medium Big Giant
Delay in the formulation of contracts 8.18 8.12 9.46 7.79
Delay in payments 24.68 29.42 27.01 25.14
Inflation and prices adjustment 5.89 7.61 9.98 11.36
Disagreement in unit prices 4.61 6.20 7.22 8.27
Modification or cancellation of contracts 4.12 4.46 4.53 5.42
Scarcity of skilled personnel 4.39 5.40 5.64 6.61
Credit restrictions 6.58 6.04 5.63 5.29
Lack of machinery and equipment 2.23 2.12 1.82 2.27
Scarcity of materials 2.92 3.03 3.13 3.75
Lack of work 19.68 12.58 9.45 8.96
Excessive red tape 4.27 4.52 4.34 4.88
Other (unfair competition, low profitability) 12.45 10.50 11.79 10.26
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Revista Mexicana de la Construccion, No. 455, December 1992
The delay in payments is the main problem that Mexican construction companies
have to overcome, independently of their size. It can be seen that the lack of work is the
second problem in importance for the small and medium sized companies. In the case of
big and giant firms, the second problem is inflation and price adjustments. It is important
to mention that in the problem of delay in payments for completed work, the time
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between authorization of the bill and the payment is much more pronounced with public
sector clients than with private sector clients.
1.2.2: Demand for Construction.
The demand for construction services in Mexico can be divided into public sector
and private sector clients. The public sector accounts for 61.12 percent of the total
production of firms affiliated with CNIC, while the private sector represents 18.06
percent of this production. The concessions, banks, and the recently privatized Mexican
Telephone Company (TELMEX) account for 9.62 percent of the total construction
demand.4 Other type of clients (not specified by CNIC, but perhaps foreign firms doing
business in Mexico) account for 11.20 percent of the demand. Table 1.9 shows a
breakdown of the volume of production by sector and type of client.
It is significant to note that the participation of the federal government decreased
from 17. 59 percent in 1990 to 15.58 percent in 1991, while the state and municipal
subsector decreased from 13.30 percent to 12.48 percent. The private sector increased its
participation from 25.99 percent in 1990 to 27.68 percent in 1991.
4 Concessions are based on the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model of privately financed infrastructure.
In this model, the government awards concessions for periods of up to 30 years to private consortiums to
develop infrastructure and profit from its operation. The initial such-of-a-kind projects started to operate in
1991. The Mexican banks and TELMEX were in the process of privatization during that same year. Thus,
these three sectors were not considered public nor private in CNIC's classification since they had both
characteristics during 1991.
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Table 1.9: Volume of Production for Firms Affiliated to CNIC by Sector
and Client
SECTOR AND CLIENT 1990 (a) 1991 (b)
Volume of production % Volume of production %
(mill. pesos) (mill. pesos)
PUBLIC SECTOR
Federal Government Subsector 3,090,282 17.59 4,297,888 15.58
SARH 252,985 1.44 347,516 1.26
SEDUE (now SEDESOL) 115,951 0.66 124.113 0.45
SCT 614,894 3.50 1,558,305 5.65
DDF 1,194,651 6.80 1,194,241 4.33
SECOGEF 16,548 0.06
SP 26,353 0.15 41,371 0.15
SS 122,979 0.70 171,000 0.62
FIRCO 43,921 0.25 49,645 0.18
CNA 342,584 1.95 645,387 2.34
SG 154,602 0.88 115,839 0.42
STC 152,845 0.87
ISFAM 68,517 0.39
SEP 33,924 0.12
States and Municipal Subsector 2,336,597 13.30 3,442,724 12.48
Government owned companies
and descentralized subsector 6,983,436 39.75 9,119,909 33.06
ASA 94,869 0.54 126,895 0.46
PEMEX 1,855,223 10.56 3,404,104 12.34
CFE 989,101 5.63 1,395,848 5.06
CAPFCE 317,988 1.81 446,892 1.62
FOVISSSTE 421,641 2.40 228,963 0.83
INFONAVIT 1,495,070 8.51 1,577,915 5.72
BANOBRAS 133,520 0.76 173,791 0.63
CPFISC 158,115 0.90 383,444 1.39
FERRONALES 105,410 0.60 118,620 0.43
FERTIMEX 179,198 1.02 228,963 0.83
FONATUR 84,328 0.48 140,688 0.51
IMSS 303,933 1.73 300,687 1.09
ISSSTE 105,410 0.60 113,102 0.41
SNC 302,177 1.72
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FONDEPORT 112,438 0.64 124,137 0.45
TELMEX (c) 272,310 1.55
POI-IPN 19,325 0.11
IISA 5,271 0.03
CONASUPO 28,109 0.16 79,999 0.29
FONHAPO 85,516 0.31
ISSFAM 91,034 0.33
STC (METRO) 99,309 0.36
PRIVATE SECTOR 1,566,026 25.99 4,982,019 18.06
Residential 235,416 1.34 479,995 1.74
Tourism 497,186 2.83 446,892 1.62
Industrial 1,280,736 7.29 1,464,813 5.31
Other 1,800,761 10.85 2,590,319 9.39
CONCESSIONS 751,927 4.28 1,335,159 4.84
BANKS 518,616 1.88
TELMEX 799,992 2.90
OTHER 592,055 3.37 3,089,624 11.20
TOTAL 17,568,396 100.00 27,585,930 100.00
Sources:(a) Revista Mexicana de la Construccion, No. 442, November 1991
(b) Revista Mexicana de la Construccion, No. 455, December 1992
The Telephone Company (TELMEX) was privatized on 1991.
List of acronyms:
SARH: Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources.
SEDUE: Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology.
SEDESOL: Secretaria de Desarrollo Social
SCT: Ministry of Communications and Transportation.
DDF: Federal District Department.
SECOGEF: Ministry of the Federation General
SP: Ministry of Fishing.
SS: Ministry of Health.
FIRCO: Fiduciary for Shared Risk.
CNA: National Water Comission.
SG: Ministry of Government.
STC: Collective Transportation System (Metro).
ISFAM: Security Institute for the Mexican Armed Forces.
ASA: Airports and Auxiliary Services.
PEMEX: Mexican Petroleum.
CFE: Federal Electricity Commission.
CAPFCE: Administrative Committee of the Federal Program for School Construction.
FOVISSSTE: Housing Fund of the Security and Social Services Institute for State Workers.
INFONAVIT: Institute of the National Fund for the Workers Housing.
BANOBRAS: National Bank of Public Works and Services.
CPFISC: Federal Income Roads and Bridges and Related Services.
FERRONALES: National Mexican Railroads.
FERTIMEX: Mexican Fertilizers.
FONATUR: National Fund for Tourisnm Foment
IMSS: Social Security Mexican Institute.
ISSSTE: Security and Social Services Institute for State Workers.
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SNC: National Credit Societies.
FONDEPORT: National Fund for Port Development.
TELMEX: Mexican Telephones.
POI-IPN: Works and Installations Patronage of the National Politechnic Institute.
IISA: Inmobiliary Installations for Industries.
FONHAPO: National Fund for Popular Housing
CONASUPO: Popular Goods National Company.
1.2.3: The Mexican Construction Market.
Since the end of 1987, the Mexican economic policy has featured some
government-labor-private sector economic pacts that have successfully reduced inflation
and restored economic confidence. As a result of this policy and as a way to generate
employment, the government has allocated more financial resources to invest in major
construction, housing, and other social projects such as the construction of hospitals,
schools, dams, and other basic infrastructure needed in the country.
The present administration assigned 1.93 billion U.S. dollars in 1989 to construct
250,000 low cost housing units. Mexico expected to receive from the World Bank an
additional 700 million dollars loan for low-cost housing during 1991. The National
Housing Plan published by the federal government in 1990, estimated a deficit of 6.1
million houses. The greatest housing deficits are in the outskirts of urban cities, such as
Mexico City (2.7 million homes), Guadalajara (0.5 million), Monterrey (0.5 million), and
those in the northem states (1.2 million). The estimated housing deficit in rural areas is
1.2 million units.5  With a total expected population of 95 million people in 1995 and
104 million people by the year 2000, the population (aged 20 to 49 years old) that will
need a house will continue to increase.
5 The Construction Market in Mexico, Construction Review, July/August 1991
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The public sector is committed to carry out several projects to meet the demand of
basic infrastructure such as highways, railroads, irrigation systems, dams, schools, and
hospitals. The National Investment program calls for the construction of several
important highways, including Hermosillo to Nogales and Monterrey to Tampico. Other
federal government projects include a second track on the railroad line from Mexico City
to Veracruz and a new rail track from Mexico City to Queretaro. With regard to the
existing port facilities, the investment program includes the modernization and
conservation of the ports of Progreso, Altamira, Ldzaro Cdrdenas, Guaymas, Puerto
Madero, Tuxpan, Coatzacoalcos, Tampico, and Veracruz. The National Water
Commission will increase the irrigation system. Twenty-nine projects have been
identified as priorities in Jalisco, Nuevo Le6n, Baja California, Sinaloa, Colima, Oaxaca,
Hidalgo, Durango, Michoacin, Tamaulipas, and Chihuahua.6
The demand for housing and construction materials and products in the Mexican
market will increase if NAFTA is approved. Tariffs will drop dramatically over a period
of years and will make materials and products for the housing and construction industry
less costly for Mexican companies to import from the United States. According to the
U.S. Department of Commerce, the best sales prospects for United States' companies in
Mexico are: services for industrial plant design and engineering, as well as for a variety
of construction projects such as highways, dams, hospitals, etc., construction materials,
industrial trucks and tractors, hoist cranes and monorails, cements for plastering in the
housing, commercial, and industrial construction segments, builder's hoists, bricklayer's
tools, bricks, standard ladders, masonry bonds, wallcoverings of vinyl and insulation
materials, sanitary ware, plumbing fixture fittings and trim-manufacturing and heating
S6Op. cit.
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equipment for homes and commercial industry.
To meet growing needs, Mexico will need to import more materials and services.
Imports of construction related materials amounted to 314.4 million dollars in 1989, and
350 million dollars in 1990. The estimated average annual growth rate for the following
three years is 12 percent. The reason for this growth is the demand that will be generated
by new companies which will construct manufacturing facilities in the country as a result
of the opening of the Mexican economy and the changes in regulations to promote
foreign investment. In addition, the housing industry will keep importing materials to
meet the expected demand of new homes needed within the next ten years.
The United States has had an important role and position in the Mexican market for
several years. In 1990 the U.S. was by far the main foreign supplier of materials and
equipment for the housing and construction sector, since it accounted for 65% of total
imports. Japan was a distant second, followed by Germany, France, Italy, and Spain (see
Table 1.10).
Table 1.10: Import Market Shares of Construction Materials and
Equipment (1990)
USA 65%
Japan 10%
West Germany 8%
France 6%
Italy 5%
Spain 2%
Other countries 4%
Source: The Construction Market in Mexico, Construction Review, July/August 1991
The Mexican government currently has an ambitious 9.8 billion dollar plan to
construct approximately 6,500 kilometers of concession roads by 1994. Of the 32 build-
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operate-transfer concessions granted since 1989 (involving 28 highways totaling 3,000
kilometers and four international bridges) only nine projects were finished and sections
of seven were in operation by March, 1992. The completed jobs total 1,000 kilometers of
highways and two bridges. By 1991, total investment in the program amounted 4.6
billion dollars, 74% funded by the Mexican private sector and the rest by the public
sector.7  An U.S. infrastructure consultant attending a meeting in Mexico in March,
1992, claimed that "In terms of road concessions, most Mexican banks seem to have
reached their limit, both in terms of risk exposure and portfolio capacity" 8 . Thus, the
main problem currently affecting privatization in Mexico is the search for innovative
financing sources and methods. Some additional problems are project cost overruns that
some blame on incomplete, government-supplied engineering, overly optimistic traffic
estimates, and government-set tolls. Also, much of the risk is thrown on contractors, and
government officials have the last say in case of disagreements. A contractor bears heavy
responsibility for cost overruns due to change orders.
1.3 Scope of this Thesis
The objective of this thesis is to provide some insights into the probable effects of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the Mexican construction
industry and to analyze several factors that may affect the competitiveness of Mexican
construction companies in an expanded market. Canada and Mexico have never had
significant trade, investment, or political ties9 , so the thesis focuses on the Mexico-U.S.
7Mexico privatization needs billions, Engineering News-Record, March 23, 1992
8 Prev. Cit.
9 Waverman, Leonard; "A Canadian Vision of North American Economic Integration"; Continental Ac-
cord: North American Economic Integration; Edited by Steven Globerman; The Fraser Institute; 1991
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portion of the agreement. Nevertheless, NAFTA represents an opportunity for Mexico
and Canada to develop a closer relationship and become the political friends that they
should be.
Chapter 2 gives a general overview of NAFTA and its origins, focusing on issues
that may affect the construction industry. Some data and statistics regarding U.S.-Mexico
trade are presented. Some concerns with the implementation of NAFTA that
representatives from several subsectors of the economy have expressed are discussed,
especially those regarding the environment.
Chapter 3 is intended to analyze the possible direct and indirect impacts of this
agreement on the Mexican construction industry. Some issues regarding the current
situation and problems of the Mexican construction industry are identified and discussed.
These issues have been identified by the CNIC. The involvement of Mexican
construction firms in the U.S. market is evaluated and some barriers that limit their
participation in that market are identified. Some actions proposed by CNIC to be
undertaken by the industry and government in order to make the implementation of
NAFTA as positive as possible for the industry are presented.
Chapter 4 presents the results of a survey responded by thirty Mexican construction
companies. The objectives of the survey were to determine how construction firms
actually evaluate the issues identified in Chapter 3. Also, the survey allowed the
assessing of how these companies perceive NAFTA and its potential impact in their
market and in the way they do business. Some strategies to cope with NAFTA were
judged by the responding firms.
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Finally, Chapter 5 contains the conclusions and recommendations to make the
impact of NAFTA as favorable as possible to the construction sector. A summary of the
challenges and opportunities that NAFTA represents is provided. The Appendix includes
the questionnaire and the cover letter sent to the Mexican firms for the survey.
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Chapter 2: Overview of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).
2.1 Background.
Since Mexican President Carlos Salinas took office in 1988, several economic
reforms have been implemented. Inflation has been cut from nearly 160 percent in 1987
to less than 20 percent in 1991. An ambitious privatization program has targeted 70
percent of government-owned businesses for sale to private ownership. From 1982
through May 1992, Mexico privatized 1,008 firms.1 From April 1991 to July 1992, the
Mexican Government sold its controlling interest in Mexico's 18 commercial banks.2
Economic diversification has also been one of the present administration's goals.
Less than 10 years ago, petroleum products accounted for 70 percent of Mexico's
exports. Today, oil represents less than 30 percent of its exports. Between 1983 and
1990, non-oil exports increased at an average rate of almost 20 percent, one of the
highest export growth rates for manufactured products in the world.3
On February 5, 1991, Mexico's President Carlos Salinas, U.S. President George
Bush, and Canada's Prime Minister Brian Mulroney formally proposed a North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The United States and Canada had
previously signed a bilateral agreement which went into effect on January 1, 1989. If
NAFTA is implemented, it will create the largest free trade zone in the world,
encompassing 362 million consumers with a combined GNP of $6 trillion.
1 The Wall Street Journal, 12/2/92
2The Wall Street Journal, 11/5/92
3 SECOFI; Mexico, United States, and Canada: Partners in Trade
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The NAFTA proposal was an initiative of Mexico's president, Carlos Salinas de
Gortari. Even though he had been taking many dramatic initiatives to encourage new
investment since he took office in 1988, the response from both foreign and Mexican
business was disappointing. He needed to send a convincing signal that his dramatic
pro-business policy changes were going to be permanently "locked in", regardless of who
succeeds him as president. 4
One of the main arguments behind NAFTA is that the existence of markets without
external competition discourages entrepreneurial creativity and competitiveness, which is
reflected in a productive structure which is oversized in some sectors, lacks
specialization, lags behind technologically, and thus stimulates the emergence of
monopolies. 5
It is expected that, by increasing the productivity of the Mexican productive
structure, new investments will be attracted, and Mexican products will be able to
compete in international markets. This will be reflected in the creation of new and better
paid jobs, and will imply improved social well-being. 6
Another main argument used to support NAFTA is the emergence of trading blocs in
the rest of the world. The new international scenario, in which the ideological perspective
has changed from the traditional East-West confrontation towards a marked dispute to
obtain capital, acquire technology, and gain markets, has made it necessary to align
national economies to the process of globalization. 7 Europe and the Pacific Basin pose
increasing challenges to North American firms competing in world markets. In 1993, the
4Fox, Jonathan; Agriculture and.the Politics of the North American Trade Debate
5 SECOFI; Presentacidn del Dr. Jaime Serra Puche ante la Cdmara de Senadores
6 0p. cit.
7 Op. cit.
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European Economic Community will integrate its market, creating a trading bloc of 324
million people with a combined GNP of $4.2 trillion. 8 The addition of the newly
democratized Eastern European nations as a reserve of markets and skilled labor will
substantially increase the European Community's competitiveness.
Simultaneously, Japan has incorporated the newly emerging Asian economies into
production processes in a way that goes beyond mere trade relations, dramatically
enhancing the Pacific Basin's trade power.
It is maintained that now is perhaps the only opportunity North Americans have to
create a large economic zone that, while recognizing cultural differences, can match the
economic power of Europe and the Pacific Basin. It is important to stress the fact that
NAFTA represents an Agreement between countries with different levels of development
and distinct cultures.
The US Congress gave former President George Bush fast-track authority to begin
NAFTA negotiations on May 24, 1991.9 Actual negotiations began on June 12, 1991
with a meeting in Toronto of the trade representatives from the three countries: Jaime
Serra Puche, Mexican Commerce Secretary; Michael Wilson, Canadian Trade Minister;
and Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative.10 The negotiations concluded on August 12,
1992, and the Agreement was signed by the leaders of the three countries on December
17, 1992. Currently the Agreement is under evaluation by the lawmakers of the three
countries and, if approved, it will be implemented on January 1st., 1994. The negotiation
and approval process of NAFTA is schematically displayed in figure 2.1.
8 SECOFI; Mexico, United States, and Canada: Partners in Trade
9
'House Extends "Fast-Track" Boosting Mexico Trade Pact; The Wall Street Journal 5/24/91
10o Talks Started on Free Trade Agreement, Journal of Commerce, 6/13/91
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To exploit lower Mexican wages, American manufacturers of autos and auto parts,
apparel, electronics, toys, and other labor-intensive goods will probably shift more low-
paying jobs to Mexico from the U.S. and the Far East. In 1989 total compensation for
production workers averaged a little over $2 an hour in Mexico, about one-seventh the
U.S.rate. It is expected that free trade will create higher skilled and better-paying jobs in
the U.S. as a result of growth in exports. Mexico's proximity to the U.S. means lower
transportation costs and a much shorter travel time in comparison to the Far East. Some
labor leaders claim that Mexico's inadequate environmental and worker protection will
encourage American companies to move there to evade strict standards. In fact, Mexican
laws are just as strict as U.S. regulations, but until recently nobody enforced them. 11
Even though U.S. tariff levels are low by world standards, trade restrictions
dramatically increase prices and the cost of living in the U.S. 12 Restrictions in clothing,
automobiles, and steel are estimated to cost U.S. consumers over $1 billion a year in each
sector.
" Viva Free Trade with Mexico; Fortune 6/17/91
' Consmwner's Stake in Free Trade; The Christian Science Monitor 12/4/91
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Figure 2.1: Negotiations and Approval Process for NAFTA
Source: Mexico/United States Free Trade; Fact Sheets; Embassy of Mexico
Congressional Approval
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Much has been written about the number of jobs that increased trade between the
U.S. and Mexico is likely to create. The estimated figure varies somewhat; for example,
the U.S. trade representative Carla Hills says that each additional $1 billion of U.S.
exports will mean 19,000 new U.S. jobs. 13 In contrast, Rudiger Domrnbusch, an M.I.T.
economist, maintains that every $1 million of net exports creates an extra 30 jobs (or
30,000 jobs for $1 billion of net exports). 14
Several studies have been carried out in order to forecast the possible impact that
NAFTA could have on the economies of the U.S. and Mexico. A list of some of these
studies follows and their main findings are summarized:1 5
U.S. International Trade Commission (The Likely Impact on the United States of a
Free Trade Agreement with Mexico):
The main findings of this study are:
* NAFTA is likely to have little or no effect on employment levels in the United States.
* As Mexican wages increase, the incentive to migrate to the United States will tend to
disappear.
* NAFTA would have no impact on U.S. imports of cement from Mexico, but it would
lead to a significant increase in U.S. exports.
* The amount of investment drawn away from the United States as a result of NAFTA
would be small because of the much smaller size of the Mexican economy.
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas:
13 Hills, Carla A.; The Big Free Trade Bounty; Cleveland Plain Dealer 9/6/91
14 Dornbusch, Rudiger, If Mexico Prospers, so will We; The Wall Street Journal 4/11/91
15 MexicolUnited States Free Trade: Fact Sheets; Embassy of Mexico
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According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, if all of the maquiladoras 16 were
shut down tomorrow, many jobs would not return to the United States. Instead they
would go to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, or Korea.
Rudiger Dornbusch (M.I.T.):
According to Rudiger Domrnbusch, of M.I.T., if the Mexican economy grows faster,
immigration to the United States will diminish. The choice for the United States is not so
much to keep jobs or lose them to Mexico. Most of U.S. lost jobs over the last decade
have gone to Asia. The right question to ask is: When jobs go abroad, wouldn't the
United States prefer them to go to Mexico rather than to Asia? The European experience
with the integration of Spain, Portugal, and Greece into the Common Market shows just
how dramatically both groups of countries benefited. 17 The wage discrepancy between
Portugal and Germany is virtually identical to that between Mexico and the United
States.
CIEMEX-WHARTON (The Implications for the U.S. Economy of Tariff Schedule
item 807 and Mexico's Maquiladora Program):
The elimination of the maquiladora regime would bring about a decrease of $2.6
billion in the U.S. GNP and a loss of 76,000 jobs. The primary impact would be felt in
the manufacturing sector with a loss of 29,000 jobs over a six-year span.
1'6 The Maquiladora Program started in Mexico in the 1960's. Under this program, U.S. firms can build
plants in Mexico (called "maquiladoras") and export parts with zero tariff to be assembled in these plants.
The finished product is then imported with a tariff only on the value added in Mexico
17 More affluent countries have benefited from gains in efficiency derived from more intense competition.
These gains include improved economies of scale, lower prices in formerly protected markets for inputs,
and increased entrepreneurial innovation and investment. Less affluent countries have also found member-
ship in the EC particularly rewarding. People have begun to proclaim a Spanish and Portuguese miracle
after seeing the high growth and lower inflation rates since their membership to the EC. Piper, R.P., and
Reynolds, A.; "Lessons from the European Experience"; Continental Accord: North American Economic
Integration; Edited by Steven Globerman; The Fraser Institute; 1991
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The maquiladoras have greatly benefited the United States. Without them, many
small and medium-sized American firms would probably have been driven out of
business by foreign competition. By having production sharing activities in Mexico,
these companies can keep jobs in the United States. Rather than competing with U.S.
producers, the real competitors of maquiladora plants are off-shore facilities in Far-East
countries.
Policy Economics Group of KPMG Peat Marwick: 18
A study conducted by the Policy Economics Group of the accounting and economics
consulting firm KPMG Peat Marwick shows that the direct impact on the U.S. economy
of removing only trade barriers is positive but small overall. This is because the U.S.
economy is 25 times larger than Mexico's.
The stimulus to investment in Mexico can be very great if Mexico liberalizes its
investment regime as part of NAFTA. With investment liberalization in Mexico, the
study projects that NAFTA would result in a one-time increase in investment in Mexico
of $25 billion. Much of that total might be money repatriated by Mexicans while some
would be direct investment by American companies. But a lot of the corresponding
additional demand for exports to Mexico -perhaps $18 billion- would be supplied by the
U.S.
" U.S. Council of the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee; 2/27/91
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2.2 Mexico-U.S. Trade.
Trade between Mexico and the U.S. has grown dramatically in the last years (see
figure 2.2). U.S.-Mexican trade reached $58.6 billion in 1990, double the level in 1986,
making Mexico the United States' third largest trading partner after Canada and Japan.
The United States accounts for two- thirds of Mexico's trade, supplying Mexico with
more than two-thirds of its imports, and taking nearly 70 percent of its exports. 19 More
than one-third of all retail sales in Southern border states of the United States are made to
Mexicans.20
Growth of U.S./Mexico Trade(total imports plus exports)
in billions of dollars
58.6
1986 1987 1988
Source: Partners in Trade. SECOFI
1989 1990
Mexican imports from the United States have increased from $12 billion in 1985 to
more than $28 billion in 1990. This dramatic increase in U.S. exports to Mexico has
created an estimated 400,000 new jobs for American workers.
19 SECOFI; Mexico, United States, and Canada: Partners in Trade
20Mexico/United States Free Trade: Fact Sheets; Embassy of Mexico
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The average Mexican worker already spends 15 percent of his income on American
goods. Thus, it is expected that as Mexican incomes rise as a result of free trade,
Mexicans will purchase more U.S. goods, creating jobs and economic growth in the
United States.
Table 2.1 gives a general idea of the amount of U.S. exports to Mexico on a state by
state basis.
Between 1987 and 1990, 45 states and the District of Columbia expanded exports to
Mexico. Thirty-three states and D.C. saw exports to Mexico grow faster than exports to
the rest of the world. The top ten state exporters to Mexico in 1990 represented diverse
parts of the country and accounted for $24.2 billion, or 85 percent, of total U.S. exports
to the Mexican market. Twenty-two states more than doubled exports to Mexico between
1987 and 1990. Non-border states registered the greatest percentage of growth in
shipments to the Mexican market. Border states, however, show the largest increases in
the dollar value of exports to Mexico. The 95 percent increase in U.S. exports to Mexico
from 1987 to 1990 was far greater than the 57 percent growth in U.S. exports to the rest
of the world over the same period. Consequently, the Mexican share of U.S. exports rose
from 5.9 percent in 1987 to 7.2 percent in both 1989 and 1990. Nineteen states counted
Mexico among their top five foreign markets, ten states ranked Mexico as one of their top
three export destinations, and Mexico was the number one export market of two states:
Texas and Arizona. 21
21 U.S. Exports to Mexico, a State by State Overview 1987-90; U.S. Department of Commerce
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Table 2.1: STATE EXPORTS TO MEXICO: 1987--90
(Thousand S) (Percent Change)
1987 1983 1989 1990 1988.-89 1989-90 19.87-90
ALABAMA $30•S1 $114,216 $156,037 $160,335 36.6 2.s 990
ALASKA 5.293 2,671 9,942 4,724 271.3 -52.5 .-10.7
ARIZONA 644,677 761,786 759,494 L50,613 -0.3 12.0 31.9
ARKANSAS 37,710 42,664 810.519 46,752 33.7 -41.9 24.0CALIFORNIA 2,257,263 3,241,765 4,172,918 4,670518 2S.7 11.9 106.9
COLORADO 69,290 79,955 96,398 113,553 20.6 17.8 63.9
CONNECTICUT 115,373 160,174 182,953 175,896 14.2 -3.9 52.5
DELAWARE 23,033 33,900 51,414 117,121 32.2 127.8 317.8
DIST. OF COL. 4,932 7,063 6,627 3,464 -4.2 27.7 71.6
FLORIDA 218,99 326,336 424,199 494,089 30.0 16.5 125.6
GEORGIA 108,097 157,208 232,017 435,118 47.6 17.5 302.5
HAWAII 61 216 22 37 49.9 68.2 -39.0
IDAHO 11,238 36,331 22,652 31,075 -37.7 37.2 176.5
ILLINOIS 278,373 448,166 569,203 880,814 27.0 54.7 216.4
INDIANA 270,929 155,910 203,961 219,211 30.8 7.5 -19.1IOWA 66,0S4 93,773 116,720 37,983 24.5 -24.6 33.1
KANSAS 124,979 279,445 221,210 186,791 -20.8 -15.6 49.5
KENTUCKY 43,266 86,127 99,423 113,165 15.4 13.3 161.6
LOUISIANA 377,426 530,149 671,019 735,554 26.6 9.6 94.9
MAINDE 2,615 10,t58 11,237 14,46 3.5 32.1 453.0
MARYLAND 17,044 33,212 25,262 53,377 -23.9 111.3 213.2
MASSACHUSETTS 100,117 116,530 155,449 134,667 33.4 18.8 84.5
MICHIGAN 1,077,870 1,317,396 1,720,558 1,432,0538 30.6 -16.8 32.9
MINNESOTA 89,975 135,383 162,347 162,680 20.3 .0.1 80.8
MISSISSIPPI 52,510 69,557 97,460 80,390 40.1 -17.5 53.1
MISSOURI 198,713 312,727 322,043 273,534 3.0 -15.1 37.7
MONTANA 1,219 2,255 19,948 9,661 734.6 -51.6 692.5
NEBRASKA 44,546 52,275 50,581 33,514 -3.2 -33.7 -24.8
NEVADA 2,706 5,476 22,207 32.343 305.5 45.7 1095.5
NEW HAMPSHIE 9,790 14,230 18,316 23,379 23.3 27.6 138.8
NEW JERSEY 189,209 266,749 390,817 417,009 46.5 6.7 120.4
NEW NMECO 9,053 15,968 14,479 17217 -9.3 18.9 90.1
NEW YORK 512,368 827,931 834,234 101,299 0.8 -4.0 56.4
NORTH CAROLINA 94,670 137,110 190,184 228,435 38.7 20.1 141.3
NORTH DAKOTA 39,336 37,433 51,651 46,897 37.1 -9.2 17.6
OHIO 245,232 381,331 464,034 444,690 21.7 -4.2 81.3
OKLAHOMA 44,248 97,769 62,369 55,839 -36.2 -10.5 26.2
OREGON 19,477 23,453 38,067 42,986 62.3 12.9 120.7
PENNSYLVANIA 181,126 337.393 474,687 5.2,604 40.7 22.7 221.7
RHODE ISLAND 14,664 23,941 32,1 08 41,011 34.1 27.7 179.7
SOUTH CAROLINA 32,350 54,153 59,751 52,536 8.9 -12.1 62.4
SOUTH DAKOTA 5,353 4,760 5,251 5,722 10.3 9.0 6.8
TENNESSEE 100,938 141,177 244,237 283,176 73.0 15.9 130.5
TEXAS 6,465,123 9,334,029 11,010,627 13,227,718 18.0 20.7 105.5
UTAH 37,088 50,915 31.758 40,082 -37.7 26.2 3.1
VERMONT .2,570 16,351 11,550 16,.531 -29.4 43.6 545.3
VIRGINIA 41,056 63,513 15,743 108,444 35.0 26.5 164.1
WASHINGTON 83,332 90,990 119,270 91,641 31.1 -23.2 9.9
WEST VIRGINIA 43,933 18,567 26,273 30,516 41.5 16.1 -30.6
WISCONSIN 77,322 33,1833 135,217 136,.30 62.5 1.2 77.0
WYOMING 3,374 3,055 3,324 11,168 25.2 210.4 251.7
TOTAL U.S. $14,582,239 $20,643,409 $24,963,123 V23,375,468 21.0% 13.6% 94.6%
Source: U.S. Exports to Mexico, a State by State Overview 1987-90; U.S. Department of Commerce
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Nowadays, 1.7 percent of the products imported into Mexico require licenses, down
from 100 percent in 1982, and the maximum tariff has been sliced to 20% from 100%.
Some two thirds of the economy is now open to foreign ownership. Clopper Almon, an
economist at the University of Maryland, estimates exports of U.S. goods and services to
Mexico will rise 26.2% by 1993, versus 3.6% without a pact.22
Steel:
U.S. steel exports to Mexico have grown dramatically in the last few years. Exports
have jumped from 1.0 million short tons in 1985 to almost 4.8 million short tons in 1989,
an increase of 480 percent.
Mexico is one of the largest markets for U.S. direct exports of steel mill products,
accounting for 14 percent of all such exports in 1989.
The American Iron and Steel Institute, which represents the main U.S. steel
producers, supports NAFTA negotiations, as they see in the agreement secure access to
rapidly growing Mexican markets.23
Cement: 24
The Mexican cement industry has an outstanding international position. Presently it
is the thirteenth world producer and the third exporter. In the national market it
represents 0.4 percent of the GNP and 5.6 percent of the Construction Industry product.
During 1990, Mexican exports of cement amounted to 69.3 million dollars. The
United States was its principal market with 53.8 million dollars or 77.6 percent of the
22Viva Free Trade with Mexico; Fortune 6/17/91
2 3Mexico/United States Free Trade: Fact Sheets; Embassy of Mexico
2 4 lndustria del Cemento. Monografia 21. Tratado de Libre Comercio en America del Norte. SECOFI.
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total. In that year, Mexico imported cement for a total of only 5 million dollars, with the
United States as its main supplier with 4.9 million dollars or 96.5 percent of the total.
Mexico did not import cement from Canada during 1990.
In 1990, the United States imported 441.8 million dollars worth of cement. Its
principal supplier was Canada, with 129.3 million dollars, or 29.3 percent of the total.
Mexico was the U.S.'s second largest supplier of cement, accounting for 65.2 million
dollars or 14.7 percent of the total. It is important to mention that 100 percent of the U.S.
cement imports from Mexico were free of tariffs. However, antidumping taxes and the
"Buy American Act" (that requires all U.S. government purchases of materials and
equipment to have 50 percent of local components as a minimum), have affected
Mexican exports of cement to the U.S.
Canada did not import cement from Mexico during 1990.
Heavy construction equipment:
Caterpillar is the main supplier of heavy equipment to build new roads in Mexico; its
sales in Mexico have doubled every year since 1988 and Caterpillar expects this pace to
continue. 25 Its exports to Mexico were about $240 million in 1992.26
25The Columbia Journal of World Business, Summer 1991
26 Fites, Donald V.; Nafta and GATT Open Opportunity's Door, The Wall Street Journal
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2.3 Highlights of NAFTA. 27
On August 12, 1992, the commerce representatives of the three countries concluded
the negotiations for NAFTA. In the agreement the three countries commit themselves to
promote employment and economic growth by means of expanding trade and investment
opportunities in the free trade zone. The three govemrnments also ratified their conviction
that NAFTA will increase the international competitiveness of Mexican, Canadian, and
U.S. firms, while protecting the environment. Additionally, the commitment of the three
countries to promote sustainable development, and to protect, extend, and enforce labor
rights, as well as to improve working conditions in the three countries, is stressed.
The objectives of the Agreement are: eliminate trade barriers; promote conditions for
a fair competition, increase investment opportunities, provide adequate protection to
intellectual property rights, establish effective procedures for the application of the
Agreement and the solution of controversies, and encourage trilateral, regional, and
multilateral cooperation. The three countries expect to achieve these objectives by
carrying out the principles and rules of the agreement: national treatment, most favored
nation treatment, and transparency of procedures.
NAFTA foresees the elimination of all tariffs on goods coming from Mexico,
Canada, and the United States, over a transition period. In order to determine which
goods are appropriate to receive preferential treatment, the creation of rules of origin is
necessary.
27 This section includes extracts from: SECOFI; Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Mexico, Canadd y Esta-
dos Unidos: Resumen
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The rules of origin in the agreement are designed to:
* Assure that NAFTA's advantages will be granted only to goods produced in the North
American region and not to goods manufactured mainly or totally in other countries.
* Establish clear rules to obtain foreseeable results; and
* Reduce the red tape for exporters, importers, and producers having activities within
the agreement framework.
In order to simplify the administration of customs, NAFTA also includes provisions
for uniform rules to assure the congruent application, administration, and interpretation
of the rules of origin.
The elimination of tariffs will be immediate for some products, and for some others
there will be a gradual decrease of tariffs in equal amounts for five or ten years until their
total elimination. For very sensitive products the removal of tariffs will take a maximum
of fifteen years. In this manner each sector will be able to adapt to the new climate of
enhanced competition according to its particular situation and needs. 28
NAFTA also provides for the free temporary import of products required for
business and professional persons, such as working equipment and instruments.
The Mexican State has exclusive rights to the ownership of products, activities, and
investments in oil, gas, refining, basic petrochemicals, nuclear energy, and electricity.
However, there are opportunities for private investment in non-basic petrochemicals, and
electrical generation facilities.
NAFTA considers some emergency measures may be implemented during the
transition period if the increase in the imports coming from another member country of
NAFTA threatens to harm a national industry. These emergency measures would
28 SECOFI; Presentacidn del Dr. Jaime Serra Puche ante la Cdmara de Senadores
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suspend temporarily the elimination of tariffs, or restore the tariffs which existed prior to
the implementation of NAFTA.
With regard to the local presence and according to the Agreement, a provider of
services from another member country of NAFTA does not have the obligation to reside
or to establish an office, subsidiary, or any other kind of company in another NAFTA
member's territory as a condition to provide a service.
In order to acknowledge the licenses and certifications of professions for the three
countries, several dispositions are included in NAFTA. These dispositions intend to make
the recognition of professional titles and experience as objective and transparent as
possible. However, the studies and experience obtained by any person in one country are
not required to be recognized by any other member country of NAFTA.
Two years after the implementation of NAFTA, the requirements of nationality and
residence to provide a service will be terminated. The benefits of NAFTA can be
suppressed if a service is provided by a firm which is the property of or is under the
control of a person from a non-member country, and if that firm does not realize a
significant amount of business within the free trade zone.
Railroads:
According to NAFTA, Canadian and U.S. railroad companies will be able to
continue providing services in Mexico, such as the operation of their own locomotive
cars, as well as building and owning their terminals and financing railroad infrastructure.
Ports:
Starting with the implementation of NAFTA, Mexico will allow 100 percent of
Canadian and U.S. investments in port services and installations, such as cranes,
wharves, and terminals, for companies moving their own freight.
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The safety and technical norms for highways and railroads will be made compatible
among the three countries.
Environment:
NAFTA establishes that none of its members may reduce environmental norms to
attract investments.
Financial Services:
According to NAFTA, the providers of financial services from a member country of
NAFTA will be able to establish themselves in the other NAFTA countries. The citizens
from each country will be allowed to use financial services in any of the other NAFTA
countries.
Temporary entrance of business people:
The objectives of NAFTA are not to establish a common market with free
movement of persons. Each one of the signing countries maintains the right to protect the
employment of its national work force, to adopt the desired migratory policy, and to
protect its respective frontiers.
The entrance of Mexican professionals to the U.S. is limited to 5,500 persons
annually. This limitation will be eliminated ten years after the implementation of the
agreement.
The Agreement can be extended to include other countries approved by the three
original members. Any country member of NAFTA can quit the agreement with a
previous notification of six months.
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2.4 Environment.
Some NAFTA critics argue that pollution-intensive U.S. firms might relocate to
Mexico to take advantage of less-stringent environmental standards or lax enforcement,
as some believe is already occurring along the border.29
Officials from the EPA and Mexico's environmental agency - Social Development
(SEDESOL, formerly Urban Development and Ecology -SEDUE) - have joined with the
U.S. State Department and the International Boundary and Water Commission to tackle
several large-scale border projects. Most notably, the U.S. and Mexico agreed in July
1991 to construct a $200 million treatment plant to solve the serious water-pollution
problem in Tijuana, Mexico, that has closed San Diego beaches and threatens to destroy
the Tijuana Estuary. EPA's fiscal 1992 budget includes $100 million for this project. In
Arizona, the U.S. State Department and Mexico are investing $16 million in Nogales to
expand its overburdened international sewage-treatment plant. The U.S. State
Department is contributing $19 million for sewage-treatment facilities in Nuevo Laredo,
Mexico, across the border from Laredo, Texas.30
Mexico announced it would spend an additional $464 million to protect the
environment along its 2,000 mile border with the United States. Over the next three
years, Mexico is allotting $223 million to build sewage plants, $26 million for solid
waste disposal, $44 million to create border-area nature preserves, and $171 million for
roads and public transportation. Separately, Mexico will double the number of
environmental inspectors in the border area from 100 to 200 and set up a computer
network to monitor pollution created by border-area factories. 31
29 Reilly, William R.; Mexico's Environment will Improve with Free Trade; The Wall Street Journal 4/19/91
30 Op. cit.
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In October 1990, Mexico's president Carlos Salinas approved an allocation of U.S.
$2.52 billion to address environmental concerns. In March 1991, by presidential order, a
national gasoline refinery in Mexico City was closed at a cost of U.S. $500 million in
government revenues, in order to curb pollution in the Valley of Mexico. Since 1988,
Mexico has: 32
* Increased its environmental budget by 600 percent.
* Made available U.S. $100 million in credit for industrial purchase and installation of
anti-pollution equipment.
* Signed agreements with 1,032 industries to install anti-pollution and emission control
equipment.
* Conducted 2,425 site inspections, resulting in the suspension of violator's operations
until corrective measures were taken.
* Increased environmental investment (public and private) by eight times in real terms.
* Committed U.S. $460 million to infrastructure and enforcement along the northern
border.
In 1988 Mexico legally established environmental standards comparable to standards
of industrialized nations and penalties for non-compliance.
Mexico does not accept investments that have been rejected by other nations as
harmful to the environment, and requires submission of environmental impact statements
and risk analyses by all industries seeking establishment in Mexico. Non-compliance
results in denial of construction permits.
31 Mexico Acts to Control Pollution Along Border; The Journal of Commerce; 10/25/91
32Mexico/United States Free Trade: Fact Sheets; Embassy of Mexico
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Since 1988, 934 new industrial projects have started up. All have complied with
government requirements. Mexican inspectors have temporarily shut down 980 maquila
plants for failing to return hazardous residues to their countries of origin. Mexico has
strict restrictions on the import and export of hazardous waste, and is an important
market for pollution prevention and control equipment. One of the biggest U.S. service
firms, Waste Management Inc., is ready to operate a multimillion dollar waste incinerator
in Tijuana and to set up joint ventures with Mexican firms for plastic recycling and waste
disposal sites. 33
The General Law for Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection was
established on January 28,1988. A central element of the 1988 law is the requirement for
environmental impact assessments to be completed on all new investment projects, in
both the public and private sectors. To ensure they comply with these requirements,
many privately owned companies have already created special environmental offices to
analyze the environmental impacts of proposed business activities. By April 1991, more
than 150 industrial plants had been temporarily closed due to unsatisfactory
environmental practices.
Some argue that a rejection of NAFTA will hurt the adoption of new environmental
policies in Mexico for the following reasons: 34
* The Government of Mexico will be less likely to get support from most Mexicans for
environmental protection if they are struggling to find work or are eking out their
existence. The implementation of NAFTA will likely raise the standards of living of most
Mexicans.
33 Op. cit.
34 Free Trade Negotiations with Mexico. Environmental Matters. International Environmental Affairs.
Volume 3, Number 3, Summer 1991.
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* Rejecting NAFTA will also confirm the suspicions of those who argue that the U.S.
and other developed countries are using environmental issues to perpetuate dependency.
In the response of the Bush Administration to the issues raised in connection with the
negotiation of NAFTA, which were transmitted to the U.S. Congress by former President
Bush on May 1, 1991,35 it was proposed to improve the technical cooperation and
training of people in both countries' environmental issues, and thus enter discussions to:
Establish a "business committee" to assist small to medium-sized Mexican
businesses in meeting standards. Such assistance should include sharing experience and
expertise, preparing plans for bringing plants and operations up to current requirements,
seminars and technical exchanges, establishing a system-wide exchange of relevant
scientific/technical data and information, establishing a process for assessing the need for
technical assistance, facilitating the transfer of technology for the environment,
promoting development of technology for the environment, and encouraging the
consideration of potential health problems and environmental risk.
Also, it was proposed to review the current U.S. program implementing regulations
addressing border health problems with a view to providing additional assistance to
environmentally threatened border areas with low population densities; to improving the
public health infrastructure in the border area, emphasizing capacity building, training,
and operation of data systems; to expanding cooperative training programs; to
establishing a cooperative program for sharing laboratory facilities; and to assessing the
feasibility of Eximbank credits or guarantees for the acquisition of pollution control
equipment or other U.S. goods and services to improve Mexico's environment.
3 Op. cit.
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2.5 Main Concerns about NAFTA
Mexico fears U.S. technology and financial power, and the U.S. fears cheap Mexican
labor driving down wages. The long tradition of hostility to foreign bosses that Mexico's
people have is not unjustified considering the numbers that have sought to exploit its
resources and then disappear with the proceeds. In addition to these general concerns,
The Development Group for Alternative Policies (The Development GAP) has published
a booklet that summarizes major areas of concern within particular sectors likely to be
affected by an agreement. Some of these concerns are as follows: 36
Agriculture:
By reinforcing the trade liberalization process and current Mexican government
agricultural priorities, a NAFTA could lead to a further 30 percent loss of agricultural
jobs in Mexico, according to a study by Antonio Yunez-Yaunde of the Colegio de
Mexico. On the other hand, certain sectors of the U.S. agriculture could be seriously hurt
by a NAFTA if they were to face competition from producers in Mexico who do not have
to comply with the same laws and regulations regarding water management, chemical
registration, food safety, and environmental and labor standards.
Health and Safety Standards:
An Agreement could make nationally determined consumer standards subject to
challenge from foreign competitors as unfair barriers to trade. For example, a result of
the U.S.-Canada FTA has been the sharp reduction of meat inspection along the U.S.-
Canadian border. In addition, the Bush Administration's promotion within NAFTA of the
U.S. patent-protection system threatens to increase the cost of pharmaceutical and other
36The Development Group for Alternative Policies; Look Before You Leap: What You Should Know About
a North American Free Trade Agreement, 1991
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products to consumers in the region.
Environment:
Some environmental and consumer groups in the three countries are concerned that a
NAFTA could well result in a reduction of environmental regulations to the lowest
prevailing standards in the "free trade" area. However, the Clinton Administration has
repeatedly proclaimed that NAFTA will not be passed by the U.S. Congress until parallel
accords on the environment are negotiated.
Another major concern is that even where Mexican environmental laws are
comparable to those in the United States, enforcement has usually been a problem. The
nearly 2,000, mainly U.S.-owned, maquiladora plants across the border in Mexico are
notorious for disregarding environmental regulations and the rapid expansion of the
maquiladora industry has not been matched by an equivalent increase in sewage
treatment plants and other necessary infrastructure.
Should a NAFTA further increase the mobility of investment in the region, lower
environmental standards in Mexico would serve as a powerful incentive to U.S. and
Canadian firms to relocate there to avoid more stringent laws in their own countries.
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, parallel accords considering strict environmental
regulations are being negotiated among the three countries to avoid this situation.
Some other concerns are that national environmental regulations could be challenged
as unfair trade practices under a NAFTA and that the Bush Administration failed to
prepare an adequate environmental impact statement on a NAFTA. This situation is
changing under the Clinton Administration.
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Workers in the Maquiladoras:
An increase in skin diseases, gastrointestinal problems, nervous disorders, eyesight
deterioration, cancers and miscarriages have all been linked to factory work in the
maquiladoras. According to The Development GAP, the maquiladora industry has
managed to violate Mexican worker-rights laws with impunity. The maquiladora
program does not require that foreign industries relocating to Mexico invest in
community infrastructure or development. Some groups are concerned that NAFTA
could well lock Mexico into maquiladora-style development based on low wages, poor
working conditions and environmental degradation.
Immigration:
Although the U.S. and Mexican governments have claimed that immigration to the
United States would decrease as a result of the jobs created in Mexico under a NAFTA,
many observers are convinced that the opposite would occur.
Labor rights and Standards:
While Mexico does have labor laws protecting workers' rights, they are very often
not enforced, thus constituting another incentive for U.S. firms to relocate to Mexico.
The use of child labor, which is rampant in Mexico and on the rise in the United States,
could be exacerbated by a NAFTA as employers attempt to lower production costs in
order to remain competitive. A NAFTA could serve to weaken the already lax
enforcement of workplace health and safety standards on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico
border.
To mitigate these concerns, the Clinton Administration has urged the creation of a
Trinational Commission on Labor Standards with "independent expert staffs and the
authority to review complaints from citizens and nongovernmental organizations". The
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AFL-CIO's call for cross-border labor enforcement is based on a belief in the existence
of large-scale labor abuses in Mexico. The fact is that Mexican labor standards are little
different, and in some cases even more "pro-worker", than those in the U.S., specially
regarding worker safety and health. 37
Jobs and Wages:
Some studies claim that a NAFTA would generate substantial job losses and
downward pressure on wages in the United States due to sizable shifts of business
investment to Mexico. In addition, these studies argue that even if productivity in
Mexican industry were to increase under a NAFTA, it is doubtful that Mexican wages
would approach U.S. levels. As Mexican wages have decreased, income distribution has
also worsened, leaving a smaller market for consumer goods. If Mexican wage levels do
not recover under a NAFTA, the demand for U.S. consumer goods would also fall far
short of that projected by proponents of an agreement.
Small Businesses:
NAFTA, by further stimulating the movement to Mexico of large, U.S.-based
corporations in search of lower labor and environmental-protection costs, would
eliminate a critical market for the small companies which supply them with inputs. In
addition, the increase in low-wage imports from Mexico that would likely result from a
NAFTA would threaten many small, labor-intensive businesses in the United States.
Many Mexican small and medium-sized businesses would be unable to compete with
larger, better-capitalized U.S. firms utilizing the latest technology, since a NAFTA would
probably accelerate the redirection of credit resources away from Mexican small
businesses.
37 Breger, M.J.; How to Save a Trade Agreement, The Wall Street Journal; 4/20/93
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Democracy and Human Rights:
Public participation and press coverage of NAFTA negotiations have been severely
restricted in the three countries. Rulings made by unelected technical "experts" under a
NAFTA would supersede many existing laws passed by the legislatures of the three
countries. Many people in Canada, Mexico and the United States believe that, just as
democracy was a precondition for Spain's and Greece's entry into the European
Community, true democracy and respect for human rights should be conditions for
Mexico's involvement in a NAFTA.
All the previous concerns are severely restricting the advancement of NAFTA
negotiations. Most of these issues derive from uncertainties on the impact NAFTA will
have on different interests groups.
Throughout this chapter, several NAFTA studies have been mentioned, some of
them having contradicting conclusions. It is extremely difficult to develop an accurate
forecast of the actual effects of NAFTA. However, some rough estimates on the impact
that an agreement of this kind may have on particular sectors of the economy can be
made. The important issue is to identify what challenges and opportunities NAFTA
represents for each sector, and what the problems and obstacles are that may be faced
during the transition to a much more competitive market.
Chapter 3 attempts to identify the challenges for the Mexican construction industry.
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Chapter 3: Impact of NAFTA on the Mexican Construction
Industry
3.1 Overview.
The uniqueness of the Construction Industry makes it very difficult to analyze all the
potential factors that are likely to affect it if a North American Free Trade Agreement is
implemented. Unlike most manufacturing industries that have a "fixed" plant and a
"mobile" product, the construction industry has a "mobile" plant and a "fixed" product
which cannot be repeated. That is, every project has a particular design and geographical
location, and thus, is unique. Some consider the construction industry to be a service
industry, but this classification is arguable since service industries usually don't produce
a tangible product. The construction industry produces a constructed facility, such as a
house, building, bridge or dam.
This chapter presents the main problems Mexican construction companies might
have with regard to NAFTA. Some studies of some of these problems have already been
undertaken by the National Chamber of the Construction Industry (CNIC) of Mexico.
The findings of these studies are summarized and discussed.
Additionally, several interviews were carried out with persons related to the
Construction Industry in Mexico. Most of those interviewed were executives of some of
the largest construction companies in the country. Others were directly involved in the
negotiations of NAFTA representing the construction related sectors. Excerpts from these
interviews are included.
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3.2 The Current Situation in the Mexican Construction Industry.
This section presents the current situation of the Mexican construction industry,
focusing on its weaknesses, the barriers that limit the participation of Mexican firmnns in
the US construction market, and foreign involvement in the industry.
3.2.1 Weaknesses of the Mexican Construction Industry.
NAFTA represents a major challenge for Mexican construction companies since they
will face enhanced competition from U.S. firms which are financially stronger, with high
levels of engineering and construction technology, and with ample experience exporting
their services. Figure 3.1 shows the sizes of the five largest U.S. contractors in 1991
compared with the size of the largest Mexican contractor. Figure 3.2 shows the exports of
construction from the top five U.S. construction firms and the total exports of the
Mexican construction industry during the period 1985-1990.
Fluor Daniel Bechtel The M. W. The Foetter xample of a
Inc. Group Inc. Kellog Co. Parsons Wheeler Mexican
Corp. Corp. giant firm
Rank in the U.S. (1990)
by total contracts 1 2 3 4 
5(1990)
Figure 3.1 Comparison of the largest U.S. construction firms with
a Mexican giant firm by total value of contracts in 1991 (Million dollars)
Sources: CNIC, September 1991
ENR 5/25/92
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In addition to the economic superiority of the U.S. construction industry, Mexican
contractors point to a series of structural weaknesses in the industry that greatly diminish
their competitiveness in relation to U.S. firms. Some of those weaknesses are the
following:1
'C•mara Nacional de la Industria de la Construcci6n; "Posicidn de la Industria de la Construccidn frente
al Tratado de Libre Comercio"; January 1991
I I II I IONEOMMONN_
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The Public Works Law and Regulations (Ley de Obras Publicas):
One of the main problems that the Mexican Construction Industry faces is its
dependency on the public sector. Since this sector accounts for more than 60 percent of
the demand for construction (as seen in Chapter 1), the discontinuity of investment
programs from that sector greatly affects most of the construction firms.
All the projects contracted by the public sector are regulated by the Public Works
Law. This law is considered by most contractors a major obstacle to enhanced
competitiveness 2 . It greatly constrains the contractor's capability and flexibility since it
allocates to him the major portion of the financial and technical risks of every project
undertaken.
Construction firms also complain that there is a lack of flexibility on pricing when a
bid is prepared. They argue that some changes in the Public Works Law allowing more
flexibility in the bidding procedures would allow construction firms to increase their
profits and then invest more in modem equipment and human resource training.
Financial Aspects:
Another main problem that most contractors face is their ability to obtain
competitive credits. 3 The interest rates for bank loans are much higher in Mexico than in
the U.S., and that is considered a major weakness for Mexican contractors.
CNIC recommends maintaining the protection of Mexican construction firms
working on projects financed with international funds. They want to restore the import
taxes on foreign companies introducing equipment to work on projects in Mexico.
Mexican contractors also want to enforce the association of foreign firms with Mexican
2 Interview with Ing. Sergio Jinich, 1/21/93
3 Interview with Ing. Gilberto Borja, 1/24/92
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ones when working in Mexico.
Equipment:
The vast majority of the equipment that most Mexican contractors currently use is
old and obsolete. This equipment must be replaced with modem equipment that is not
manufactured in Mexico. Mexican contractors would like the free import of this
equipment as well as easy access to credits to buy the equipment and spare parts. The
reduction of tariffs on imported construction equipment is already being considered by
NAFTA.
Labor:
There is a strong need to intensify training efforts to enhance the skills of the
Mexican workforce. It is also important to train middle managers in modem management
techniques. But it is not just construction companies that need to redevelop their human
resources; the officers responsible for the administration of the public budget also need
further training. The characteristic employment instability of the construction industry
discourages construction firms from investing in training. Usually, once a project is
finished, several levels of operating personnel are no longer needed; thus they are laid
off. The firms then feel that it is a waste of money to invest in their training since long
term employment for these people is not possible.
Quality Control:
Most of the time the design and engineering of projects are not yet completed when
the projects are released for bids. Thus, it is hard to enforce high standards of quality
when the plans and specifications are deficient and/or incomplete. Additionally, the
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quality of the project is usually seen as the sole responsibility of the engineering
supervising rather than as the responsibility of the contractor. Illegal negotiations for the
acceptance of deficient work performed on a project is common practice in public works
in Mexico.
Lack of capability to provide integrated services:
In the Mexican construction industry, the lifetime of a project can be divided in nine
stages (figure 3.3). Traditionally, Mexican construction firms have focused on the
construction stages (V through VII); where the engineering design has been realized by
three sectors: public agencies, foreign firms, and some private consultants.
Usually undertaken by public agenacies, foreign companies
or Mexican private consultants
4N
Concentration of Mexican construction Private or publio organizations
companies (some contractors are starting to
participate under the scheme
of concessions)
Figure 3.3 Stages of a construction project in Mexico
Source: CNIC, September 1991
I
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As a result of this division of interests, most of the engineering design technology in
Mexico is in the public sector and in a few consultants. Thus, with a few exceptions,
there are no construction firms in Mexico with design capabilities, or with the ability to
provide "turn-key" services.
Irregular participation of U.S. firms in border areas:
The maquiladora program (described in Chapter 2) has stimulated the intervention of
U.S. construction firms in activities that should be performed by Mexican construction
firms. Several maquiladora plant projects developed by U.S.-based investors must be
designed by U.S. firms given the special technology necessary, but the construction
should be performed by Mexican companies. However, maquiladora owners prefer to
award the contracts directly to U.S. firms instead of calling for open bids, thus effectively
limiting the participation of Mexican construction companies in their own territory. This
situation also occurs in the housing developments for the maquiladora workers, which are
also mainly designed and built by U.S. firms. Not only this, but U.S. firms, in defiance of
specific Mexican laws, usually carry out the construction work without even being
registered in Mexico. In addition, Mexican contractors argue that U.S. firms have the
unfair advantage of not having to pay taxes in Mexico.
Lack of experience in international contracts:
The gap in international experience between Mexican and U.S. construction firms is
immense. Probably it is enough to mention that of the top 225 international contractors,
59 are from the U.S., and they billed a total of 69,450 million U.S. dollars in intemrnational
contracts during 1991.4 In contrast, only one Mexican contractor appears on that list and
4 The Top International Contractors; ENR 8/24/92
-59-
his international billings amounted to 36 million dollars.
Of the 400 top general contractors in the U.S., 61 had foreign billings during 1991.
But the 33 largest accounted for about 99% of the total awards. 5
3.2.2 Participation of Mexican firms in the U.S. construction market.
It is generally considered by persons in the industry that only large construction
companies in Mexico will be interested in exploring the U.S. construction market 6 .
Small and medium firms will not be interested or will not be able to do so mainly
because of financial reasons. Simply stated, the costs of working in the U.S., an
extremely competitive market and unknown to most Mexican firms, would be very high.
The case for large and well established firms is different. For example, Ingenieros
Civiles Asociados (ICA), the top general contractor in Mexico, created a subsidiary in
the United States (in Florida). Since 1988 this firm has been working mainly in Texas
and Florida in residential, commercial, and institutional buildings, and in the Miami
metro-mover. The volume of these activities amounts to approximately 40 million dollars
per year. Manuel Salvoch Oncins, ICA executive vice-president, puts it this way: "We
think that we know the way U.S. firms work and we consider that in Mexico, being our
principal area of business, we have enough elements to compete advantageously against
U.S. companies." 7
ICA has also plenty of experience joint-venturing with U.S. firms. They recently
announced their association with Fluor Daniel, one of the top U.S.
5 ENR 5/25/92
'Interview with Ing. Andrds Conesa, 1/13/93
7 Interview with Ing. Manuel Salvoch Oncins, 1/24/92
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Engineering/Construction companies. 8 They are joint-venturing in a tunneling project in
Chicago with Perini Corporation, and they presented a bid with Morrison Knudsen for a
project in Taiwan. 9 They also have partnerships with Bechtel and ABB Lummus Crest. 10
Recently, a five-partner consortium including ICA, Bechtel, and three other U.S.
companies was formed to design, build, and operate a $600-million, 700-Mw gas-fired
power plant at Samalayuca, in Mexico's northern state of Chihuahua. The private
consortium will lease the plant to the government-owned CFE (Federal Comission of
Electricity) for 20 years."
Another top Mexican Engineering/Construction (E/C) firm, Bufete Industrial, has
been associated for more than 10 years with M.W. Kellogg, another U.S. top E/C firm;
and J.A. Jones Construction Co. allied itself with Grupo Gutsa, a large local contractor in
Mexico City to pursue future joint-venture possibilities. 12 Another Mexican construction
company, Landa y Rubio, signed a cooperation deal with Ford Bacon & Davis of
Houston in 1991 to develop joint projects in Mexico and Central America.1 3
Of course, the cases of ICA, Bufete Industrial, Grupo Gutsa, and Landa y Rubio are
not very common in the Mexican construction industry. Other firms may find it very
difficult to enter the U.S. construction market. In a study carried out by CNIC, the
following significant obstacles to the participation of Mexican construction firms in the
U.S. market were presented:' 4
SEngineering News-Record, 12/7/92
9Interview with Ing. Andrds Conesa, 1/13/93
10 Interview with Ing. Luis Zdrate Rocha, 3/30/92
11 "Binational Group plans powerplant in Mexico"; Engineering News-Record; 3/29/93
12 ENR 5/25/92
13ENR 12/7/92
14
"Posicidn de la Industria de la Construccidnfrente al Tratado de Libre Comercio"; CNIC; January 1991
-61-
Preference for local contractors (State Bidding Preference Laws):
Some U.S. states that have strict bidding preference laws, others have reciprocal
bidding preference laws, and still others have no bidding preference laws at all. A study
conducted by the Associated General Contractors of America several years ago (1985),
found that 9 states had strict bidding preference statutes giving resident bidders a
percentage bidding advantage over non-resident bidders. Eighteen states had reciprocal
preference laws that gave preference to construction companies in their own state as well
as to those from other states which gave them reciprocal preferences. Twenty-four states
had no bidding preference laws at the time of the survey.
These bidding preference statutes are not specifically directed towards foreign
construction contractors. They are designed to protect companies within a state against
competition from construction contractors and bidders from outside the state. Thus, in
states that have strict bidding preferences, foreign country contractors have a
disadvantage in seeking contracts over companies in that particular state. The same
happens in states with reciprocal preference laws.
State Licensing and Pre-qualifications Laws:
In some states of the U.S., it is required for the contractors to be examined and
authorized to participate in a public project. In some other states, in addition to the
prequalifications, a permit to work must be obtained, and this permit must be renewed
annually. Quoting a Canadian general contractor trying to work in the U.S.: "State
licensing requirements are "a burden" to the general contractor". 15
15 Versagi, Frank J.; "Canadian-American Free Trade doesn't end confusion for contractors"; Contractor,
December 1989
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Some states require a contractor license when the job is more than $25,000.
Sometimes, to obtain a license, the technical representative for a firm must pass a
technical, administrative, and financial examination. All these requirements reduce the
opportunities of Mexican companies to enter the U.S. construction market.
As an example of these difficulties, the state of Alabama requires pre-qualification in
order to bid on highway work. Prospective bidders must pre-qualify with the state
highway department and furnish sworn statements on prescribed forms giving detailed
information in regard to financial resources, equipment, past record, experience of the
firm, credit lines with material and equipment suppliers and other information. They must
have audited financial statements. Out-of-state corporations must provide a copy of the
certificate of authority to do business in the state of Alabama, obtained from the
Secretary of State. Such certificates are only valid for one year and will set forth a dollar
limit on the amount of work that an applicant may be allowed to contract for at any one
time. An applicant may be required to take an examination to determine his
qualifications. Such an examination may be oral or written and may cover, in addition to
financial responsibility, his past record and qualifications in reading plan specifications,
estimating costs of construction, etc. When a license is issued it will stipulate the type of
work for which the applicant is qualified. As can be seen, Alabama has quite restrictive
practices concerning prequalifications and licensing.
In contrast, Alaska has no pre-qualification requirements and simply requires
registration of construction contractors and the payment of a $200 fee. However, general
contractors must provide the state proof of bonding in the amount of $10,000. In lieu of a
security bond a cash deposit may be filed with the Commissioner of Commerce and
Economic Development.
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This brief comparison of just two states is illustrative of the wide variety of laws in
this area. The laws of Alabama could easily be considered a non tariff barrier to trade and
services in construction due to the many complex requirements, examination, licensing,
etc. The laws of Alaska in contrast appear to be more easily complied by foreign
companies. However, the administration of such laws is often as important as is the
content.
U.S. Federal Government Procurement Practices:
The "Buy American" Act in its section on construction, renovation and maintenance
of public works, requires that the contractors of public projects must use "only materials
and products extracted or produced in the U.S. or that are manufactured mainly in the
U.S." This deals primarily with the use of materials and not with the nationality of the
contractor itself. One of the possible consequences of NAFTA is that the "Buy
American" Act will be expanded to include Mexican products and services.
It appears that Mexican construction companies, insofar as they are providing
services, are not generally restricted in bidding on federal government contracts.
Broader access of Mexican companies to U.S. construction projects:
Among some informal types of barriers that make it difficult for foreign construction
companies to operate in the United States is the lack of access to most sources of
information about contract proposals. For example, government contract proposals are
published daily in a publication known as Commerce Business Daily. Obviously such
publications are more accessible to United States companies than to foreign ones. In
addition only contracts over $25,000 are included in this public daily announcement.
Generally, U.S. companies have employees or agents who also regularly check different
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federal govemrnment agency bulletin boards for announcements of different types of
contracts.
Areas where the Mexican government might seek more openness include issues such
as: notice and publicity of job advertisements, request for proposals, time limits to
respond, transparency of bidding procedures and related issues.
Guarantees to Register:
In some states a guarantee of $10,000 is necessary as well as specific insurance
coverage including:
a) Damage in property to a third party: $20,000
b) Damage in person to a third party: one person $50,000; two or more persons $100,000
CNIC has been proposing during NAFTA negotiations lesser insurance to Mexican
contractors than to U.S. contractors in order to recognize the differences in financial
resources between firms from each country.
Guarantees of execution and payment:
The U.S. Federal Law requires that for every federal project costing more than
$25,000 the contractor must present guarantees. These guarantees can reach $2,500,000
for projects with a value of over $5,000,000. The states impose similar obligations for up
to 100 percent of the value of the contract. CNIC has also proposed to NAFTA
negotiators to require lesser guarantees from Mexican contractors than to U.S.
contractors, to acknowledge the differences between them. Of course, it is rather naive to
expect that the U.S. construction industry will agree with the idea of less requirements
from Mexican firms than from its own constituents.
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Minority firms:
Minority owned companies have several privileges in Federal contracts that further
reduce the opportunities of Mexican contractors in the U.S. The small business and
minorities small business set-aside programs are extremely politically sensitive and the
chances that the United States government would be willing to make changes in these
laws to adapt to NAFTA are minimal. These laws may represent barriers to foreign
contractors willing to work in the U.S. The Canadian general contractor mentioned
before was quoted: "Your minority laws are unworkable".16
However, it is possible for Mexican companies to participate in small business set
asides if in fact they establish a U.S. majority owned small business that is, at least, 51 %
owned and controlled by a U.S. citizen. This small business can then bid on U.S.
contracts and there can be minority Mexican ownership. However, the government
agencies might also look at the size of the minority owner and if it exceeds the current
small business administration guidelines (approximately $14,000,000 in average receipts)
it might not qualify.
Sureties:
Mexican contractors cannot obtain credit in the U.S. surety market. This impedes
their ability to bid for work in the U.S. Some states allow foreign surety companies to
work in the U.S. but they must have enough assets there to support their activities. Since
Mexican surety companies cannot have assets in foreign countries, they cannot support
Mexican construction companies abroad. Apparently U.S. companies will not grant such
bonds to Mexican construction companies, probably due to the lack of property in the
t6 Versagi, Frank J.; "Canadian-American Free Trade doesn't end confusion for contractors"; Contractor,
December 1989
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United States to secure them. One of the proposals of CNIC is that Canada and the U.S.
should extend national treatment to Mexican surety companies, and the same must be
done in Mexico for Canadian and U.S. surety firms.
However, according to Donald Sirkin, C.E.O. of Contractors Bonding & Insurance
Co. (Seattle, WA), there are already several U.S. bonding companies offering sureties for
Mexican contractors, among them American Bonding (Tucson, AZ) and Amwest
(Woodland Hills, CA).17
It is likely that with the implementation of NAFTA both Mexican and U.S. bonding
companies will be able to do business within any of the three member countries.
Arbitration:
Mexican construction companies feel the need to create a dispute resolution or
arbitration panel to settle disputes that may occur between Mexican construction
companies and their clients in the U.S. One issue that is included in the context of
NAFTA is the use of a binational dispute settlement panel to review unfair trade
practices. Such a panel was created as part of the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement.
As it would deal with govemrnment contracts at the state and federal level, the
establishment of such a trinational commission or arbitration panel would require
changes in a number of federal and state laws, since most of these laws already provide
for various dispute settlement mechanisms in various courts and administrative agencies.
17 Interview with Donald Sirkin, 3/25/93
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Mexican workers:
Both the U.S. and the Mexican government have indicated that immigration in
general is not a topic on the agenda for NAFTA. Immigration is a sensitive and
emotional issue and the negotiators on both sides may wish to avoid the inclusion of
immigration issues so as not to jeopardize negotiations and approval of NAFTA.
However, there may be a need for laws permitting the temporary immigration of work
crews relating to specific construction projects. There is precedence for temporary
immigration of seasonal workers both under the current law and under the previous
"Bracero Program". These were generally seasonal farmworkers rather than construction
workers. Moreover, under the Davis Bacon Act, which governs federal contracts or state
contracts using federal funds, all workers must be paid certain guaranteed wages that are
higher than the U.S. minimum wage and much higher than the Mexican wages.
Therefore, there would likely be no cost advantage in paying for the transportation and
housing of Mexican workers to work on construction crews in the U.S. if they have to be
paid David Bacon wages. However, considerable savings might be obtained if temporary
Mexican workers are used for private contracts or state contracts that do not involve
federal funds, where the Davis Bacon Act does not apply.
Temporary immigration may be restricted allowing crews to come in for relatively
short periods of time to work on defined projects. However, complex certification
procedures with the U.S. Department of Labor may be required.
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Professional services, licenses and qualifications:
Professional associations in the U.S. are well-known for protecting their
"professional territory" from foreign people. Usually, they require the foreign applicants
to pass excessively difficult exams to be certified. CNIC is concerned that these exams,
are not given to learn the capabilities of the applicant, but to eliminate him.
CNIC proposes that Mexican professionals working in the U.S. for a given project
should not be required to pass these examinations, but rather should only be required to
give proof that they have had enough experience in Mexico.
At this point it is important to include examples of laws regarding the practice of
engineering in the U.S. Two documents were reviewed: The Texas Engineering Practice
Act18 , and an Act from the state of Oklahoma relating to Engineers and Land
Surveyors. 19 It is important to mention that these laws apply to engineers doing design
work or providing technical advice, not to those who are doing construction only.
The Texas law states that only licensed and registered persons shall practice, offer or
attempt to practice engineering. To determine if an applicant is qualified to register as a
professional engineer he or she must have graduated from an approved curriculum in
engineering, pass the examination requirements, and have four (4) years or more of
active practice in engineering work. Applicants for registration as professional engineers
must be able to speak and write the English language. Any applicant needs at least five
references of which three must be professional engineers. All references must know the
applicant personally. Applicants who claim foreign engineering experience must have, in
addition to other experience, at least two years of engineering experience in the U.S. and
18 The State of Texas Law and Rules concerning the Practice of Engineering and Professional Engineering
Registration
19An Act relating to Engineers and Land Surveyors; 43rd. Oklahoma Legislature
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show that they have learned to use the U.S. standards, codes, and other engineering
procedures in their engineering practice. All these may be considered as formal barriers
for Mexican construction firms trying to start operations in the U.S. and employing
Mexican engineers.
The case of Oklahoma is the same. Applicants for a license must pass examinations
to show their qualifications; they must submit five references, three of which shall be
professional engineers having personal knowledge of the applicants' engineering
experience (obviously in the case of a Mexican applicant this would not be possible); the
applicants must pass an examination and they must hold degrees from approved
engineering curriculums of four (4) years or more.
Currently, the Federations of Engineering Schools in Mexico and the U.S. are
working, under the supervision of the Ministries of Education of both countries, towards
the recognition of the engineering curriculums and programs from Universities and
Institutions in both countries.20
Environmental issues:
There are strict regulations concerning the cleaning of imported machinery and
equipment to work on a jobsite in the U.S.. Usually such machinery carries various types
of dirt and residue. The regulations concerning its cleaning have created a barrier to
Mexican equipment crossing the border. Both countries should develop uniform
enforcement practices in this area.
20 Interview with Ing. Fernando Favela, 1/17/93
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Problems crossing the border:
In the context of the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, some experiences may
be drawn from the daily border crossing of Canadian contractors working in the U.S.
Usually there are too-frequent arguments with border guards about engineering drawings,
working drawings, bid packages, supervisory personnel, and the occasional tool or
product which has to cross the border.2 1
In a meeting of the National Association of Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contractors
(NAPHCC), attended by Canadian and U.S. firms, one Canadian contractor complained
that he still gets stopped at the border and his specifications and blueprints are inspected
by customs.22 Mexican contractors will surely face similar problems while crossing the
border to work in projects in the U.S., when NAFTA is implemented.
21 Versagi, Frank J.; "Canadian-American Free Trade doesn't end confusion for contractors"; Contractor;,
December 1989
22Mahoney, Thomas A.; "Contractors can profit from U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement"; Air Condition-
ing, Heating & Refrigeration News; 10/30/89
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Despite all these formal and informal barriers, the U.S. construction market has
always been relatively open to foreign entrants. It is interesting to compare the strategies
followed by some foreign firms in order to enter the U.S. market, since some of these
strategies may be adopted by Mexican contractors (Figure 3.4).
Origin Most common strategy Motivation Examples
European and Acquisition of U.S. construction * Size of the U.S. Philipp Holzmann and
Canadian firms (70% of cases) market Hochtief (German),
e Low market value Banister Corp. (Canadian)
of U.S. firms George Wimply (English)
Japanese Establishment of subsidiaries * Relationships with Kajima Corp.
or new firms (30% of cases) Japanese corporations Toda Construction, Co.
operating in the U.S.
* Japanese investors prefer
to work with Japanese
contractors for their
projects in the U.S.
Figure 3.4 Strategies used by foreign firms to enter the U.S. construction market
Source: CNIC, September 1991
Figure 3.5 shows the participation of foreign companies in the U.S. construction
market.
The value of contracts
performed by foreign
contractors represents
3% of the total
1982 1989
Figure 3.5 Foreign involvement in the U.S. construction market
(billion dollars)
Source: CNIC, September 1991
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3.2.3 Foreign inroads into the Mexican construction market.
For decades, even without a NAFTA, several major U. S. construction companies
have worked in Mexico. As a matter of fact, "the Mexican construction industry was
formed with the participation of foreign firms" 23 As mentioned before, they have used
different forms of association with Mexican firms. The permanent establishment of these
firms in Mexico has not been a common practice.24
It is difficult to forecast the future foreign involvement in the Mexican construction
industry, but it is expected that an increase in foreign investment will increase the
demand for construction and this will attract foreign construction companies.
Additionally, there is "a psychological element with the implementation of NAFTA,
since firms in the U.S. are starting to pay a lot more attention to what is happening in
Mexico."25
Some conservative estimates forecast that around 30 U.S. construction firms will
work in Mexico in the future. Probably these firms will be involved in industrial "'turn-
key' projects. Already, 14 of the top 400 U.S. contractors were working in Mexico during
1991,26 and 97 of the top 500 design firms in the U.S. were working there during 1992.27
23 Interview with Ing. Eugenio Laris, 1/8/93
24
"Posici6n de la Industria de la Construcci6n frente al TLC"; CNIC; January 1991
25 Interview with Ing. Eugenio Laris, 1/8/93
26 Engineering News-Record; "The Top 400 Contractors"; May 25, 1992
27 Engineering News-Record; "The Top 500 Design Firms"; April 5, 1993
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Barriers to entrance to the Mexican construction market for foreign competitors: 28
There are several barriers that prevent foreign firms from entering the Mexican
construction market. These derive from protectionism, disadvantages inherent in the lack
of knowledge of the market, and financial risks. Some are formal barriers that are
included in the legislation for foreign contractors, and others are informal barriers related
to the knowledge and experience of the Mexican market.
Formal barriers:
One of the pieces of legislation that may represent a barrier to US firms trying to
work in Mexico is the requirement for foreign firms to be authorized to work in Mexico
by the National Commission of Foreign Investments. In addition, the Population Law
limits the number of foreigners who can work in a given project.
Informal barriers:
The informal barriers are related to the foreign firms' knowledge of the Mexican
market and their previous experience working in it. Several barriers of this type have
been identified by CNIC. Most of them relate to the way that public contracts are
administered. Other barriers stem from the difficulty foreign contractors face while
determining an accurate cost-profit ratio while working in Mexico, since they are not
familiar with all the costs involved. Foreign contractors face additional risks in the
execution of projects designed by Mexican public and/or private companies. Complex
procedures and excessive red tape in the request for bids process are common in Mexico.
The lack of a third party to supervise the progress of construction is also a common
problem which US firms may find difficult to adapt to. A US firm may also encounter
obstacles in the restrictions to the access to long term credits and the higher interest rates
28
"Posicidn de la Industria de la Construccidnfrente al TLC"; CNIC; September 1991
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in the Mexican financial markets. Further barriers are the lack of knowledge and
experience with the Mexican labor market, lack of experience with local unions, and the
need to develop relationships with materials and equipment suppliers.
As can be seen, these barriers are very similar to the ones a Mexican firm may
encounter while trying to work in the US.
3.3 Situation Under NAFTA.
This section presents the objectives of the Mexican contractors concerning NAFTA.
Some considerations regarding foreign participation in the execution of public projects
are included. In addition, some impacts NAFTA may have on the Mexican construction
industry are presented, as well as some actions CNIC suggests should be undertaken by
the Mexican government.
3.3.1 What the Mexican construction industry hopes to get from NAFTA. 29
The Mexican construction industry has two main objectives in making the
implementation of NAFTA as positive as possible:
a) It wants to take advantage of the opportunities brought up by the opening of the
markets in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.
b) It wants to strengthen the position of the Mexican construction firms in the local
market.
29 
"Posicidn de la Industria de la Construccido'n frente al Tratado de Libre Comercio"; CNIC; September
1991
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Construction firms must become competitive at international levels at mid-term, in
all industry segments. This will require a transition period so that these firms can adjust
to the new competitive conditions. This period should be:
* Short enough to involve the firms in a sense of urgency to change.
* Long enough to allow an orderly and efficient reaction from the firms.
In Chapter 4 the period considered appropriate by construction companies, based on
the results from the survey, is presented and discussed.
It is important to support technology transfer and development, and investments in
training and modern equipment. According to CNIC, the opening of the markets must be
at different times for each one of the three countries so that the different levels of
development of each one of the economies can be recognized. These time periods will
vary with each sector of the economy since each one of them has a different development
level.
CNIC claims that it is also important to avoid the creation of oligopolies and
monopolies that may control a large segment of the construction market. This can be
achieved by preventing the massive acquisition of Mexican firms by U.S. and/or
Canadian firms.
It is also proposed that whenever firms in the three countries possessing similar
technical capabilities bid for a project which is financed with government resources
originating from Mexican taxes, Mexican construction firms should be given a
preference.
Foreign firms providing engineering services for projects in Mexico must employ
Mexican professionals in permanent positions. In the same manner, these firms must
offer training to insure technology and knowledge transfer to Mexican nationals.
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Project Execution:
There are three ways in which projects are financed in Mexico:
a) Own resources: those projects assigned by a public entity that are entirely financed by
the internal budget of that entity.
b) External resources not attached directly to a project: those projects assigned by a
public entity being financed by an external credit not necessarily granted for its exclusive
execution.
c) External resources attached directly to a project: those projects assigned by a public
entity that received an external credit exclusively to be used in its execution.
a) & b) Public projects financed with own resources or with external resources not
attached directly to a project:
CNIC considers that a minimum percentage of the total value of new public
construction must be executed by Mexican firms (or those with a majority of Mexican
ownership). This minimum percentage will be reduced as shown in Figure 3.6.
During the first four years, starting with the implementation of NAFTA, the
minimum percentage of public projects to be executed by Mexican firms will be 100
percent.
From the beginning of the fifth year until the end of the tenth, this percentage will be
reduced by 14.28 percent annually.
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When the execution of a project cannot be awarded to a Mexican company because
of technical or financial problems, or lack of capability of the industry, the project must
be opened to international bidders. The inability of Mexican construction firms to
participate in this project should be demonstrated by a national request for bids that
remains unanswered.
Total value of Minimum percentage to
new projects be executed by
100%-
80%.
60%.
40%-
20%
M~exicall firmsl
I , I, I I I I I l l Ii
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Years from implementation
of NAFTA
Figure 3.6 Public works contracting without attached resources
Source: CNIC, Sept. 1991
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International requests for bids:
CNIC also proposes several rules for international requests for bids for projects in
Mexico: maintain a favorable margin for the bids submitted by Mexican construction
firms. This margin should be reduced gradually over ten years as shown in Figure 3.7.
Preferential
mazgin
S S I I I I JE
I I II I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Yearxus from impL
of NAITA
Figure 3.7 Preferential margin to favor Mexican contractors in
international request for bids
Source: CNIC, Sept. 1991
10
ementation
Percent
margin
15%
12%
9%
6%
3%
I l l I I I I I l I
I | i
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An initial margin of 15 percent during the first four years of the implementation of
the agreement with a gradual reduction of 2.14 percent annually until the end of the tenth
year is proposed.
Mexican firms in association with foreign firms should have a preferential margin
proportional to the Mexican participation in the association.
c) Public projects financed with external attached resources:
In this type of project, if it is going to be executed by a foreign general contractor, it
must be in association with or by subcontracting from Mexican firms as follows: at least
50% of the value of the project must be performed by Mexican firms during the first four
years of the implementation of NAFTA. From the beginning of the fifth year until the
end of the tenth, this percentage will be reduced by an annual rate of 7.14%.
Concession Projects:
In this type of project, the concession grantee assumes the role previously assigned
to the govemrnment. CNIC proposes these concessions to be subject to the following
requirements: The concession must be granted to Mexican companies, unless a request
for bids remains unanswered for lack of technical and/or financial capabilities of
Mexican construction firms. In this case, foreign firms may participate in association with
national companies, with a participation of no more than 50 percent during the first four
years of the implementation of NAFTA, and an annual increase on the allowed
participation of 7.14 percent from the beginning of the 5th. year until the end of the 10th.
(Figure 3.8).
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participation in
the association
100 (.
90%
80/.-
~ I II __ - I 
Figure 3.8 Participation
Source: CNIC, Sept. 1991
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Years from implementation of NAFTA
of foreign firms in concession;- .projects
3.3.2 Consequences of NAFTA on the Mexican construction industry.
According to CNIC, some consequences of the opening of the Mexican construction
market with NAFTA may be the following: 30
* More orientation towards the satisfaction of client requirements.
* Closer alignment with international specifications and standards.
30
"Posicidn de la Industria de la Construccidnfrente al TLC"; CNIC; January 1991
70%1/
60%-
50%
I I I •
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foreign participation
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* Increased attention not just to cost but also to quality and execution time.
* Minimization of operation and maintenance costs of the finished product.
* More attention to the absorption of new technologies.
* Training of professionals in international engineering standards.
* Increasing influence by market forces with increase in demand for construction from
the private sector.
* Enhanced competition between U.S. and Mexican construction firms generated by
certain construction industry customers such as intemrnational manufacturing companies,
international hotel developers, or international infrastructure investors.
* Specialization in market niches by some Mexican companies in order to maintain their
competitiveness.
CNIC maintains that in order to facilitate the participation of the Mexican
construction industry in a free trade zone with the U.S. and Canada, a transition period is
required. This transition period should involve the creation of some incentives to
improve the competitive position of Mexicans companies:
a) Mexican contractors must have a favorable margin in their bid prices relative to the
prices presented by foreign contractors.
b) The imports of equipment must be exempt of import taxes when the importer is a
Mexican firm. The equipment that U.S. contractors bring to Mexico must be mobilized in
Mexican transports.
c) To be able to work in Mexico, a U.S. firm must have a legal address in Mexico and
must comply with its legal obligations.
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d) The Federal Labor Law of Mexico must be enforced so foreign contractors maintain
the proportion of foreign versus Mexican employees, including management positions.
e) Incentives must be given to research and development for construction technology in
Mexico. For example, the resources used for these activities may be made tax deductible.
f) Mexican association with U.S. construction firms possessing state-of-the-art
technology to help transfer this technology to Mexican contractors must be promoted.
3.3.3 Actions proposed by CNIC to be undertaken by the Mexican government.
CNIC has proposed several actions to be undertaken by the Mexican government to
support the construction industry in the following areas:
* Laws, regulations and practices in the industry: The authorities must try to simplify
all the regulations that affect the industry, specially those involving the public sector.
Inefficiencies in the administration of public contracts cause financial burdens over the
contractors and uncertainties in the resolution of disputes, and all this affects the
productivity of construction firms.
* Imports of machinery and equipment: CNIC proposes that the tariffs on imported
equipment for specific projects to be eliminated, as well as the elimination of import
tariffs on tools and spare parts used for imported equipment. This will take place if
NAFTA is implemented.
* Foreign acquisition of Mexican construction firms: The Mexican government must
revise and approve all the acquisitions of Mexican construction companies by foreign
firms in order to guarantee that the industry remains mainly in Mexican hands and to
avoid the creation of monopolies/oligopolies.
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* Competitive financing: The Mexican government should support construction firms by
providing easier financing to acquire equipment and to develop projects.
* Fiscal equalization: The fiscal burden on Mexican construction firms must be
equalized to that borne by U.S. and Canadian firms in their own countries.
* Technology transfer: It is desirable to transfer technology from the public to the
private sector to provide an actualized technological base for construction firms to enable
them to compete effectively. Additionally, the establishment of joint programs of
research and development between private companies and public institutions is desirable.
* Protection of intellectual property: The Mexican government must provide efficient
procedures to apply and enforce the laws that protect intellectual property in Mexico.
On their part, CNIC commits itself to take the following actions to support the
industry for the challenges of NAFTA:
* Develop training programs for middle managers in new design and construction
technology and equipment, in strategies and procedures to attract foreign investment, and
in characteristics and specifications of construction contracts in the U.S. and Canada.
* Realize studies of fiscal issues of Mexico and its NAFTA partners in order to propose
mechanisms to balance the differences.
* Form committees with professional associations and educational institutions to define
standards and procedures for granting licenses and certifications to professionals, these
documents being valid in the three NAFTA countries.
* Continue to negotiate the elimination of the excess of norms affecting the industry, and
promote the creation of third parties to resolve disputes with the government.
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* Cooperate with the Foreign Investments National Commission to evaluate the impact of
the acquisition of Mexican firms by foreign investors.
* Promote the cooperation of Mexican firms with foreign investors, contractors, and
owners to gradually obtain a greater presence in foreign markets.
* Inform its members about requests for proposals for public projects in the U.S. and
Canada, and also on the requirements that contractors must comply with to present a bid.
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Chapter 4: A Survey of Mexican Construction Companies
4.1 General
In order to get a better understanding of the main concerns of Mexican construction
companies regarding NAFTA, a questionnaire was sent to 246 Mexican construction
firms. The questionnaire was composed of 29 questions and a cover letter explaining the
motives for the research. It was divided into seven sections, including the characteristics
of each firm (5 questions), the characteristics of the Mexican construction market (5
questions), international activities of the firms (5 questions), impact of NAFTA (4
questions), strategies for competing in an expanded market (3 questions), ways to
implement these strategies (3 questions), and general comments (4 questions). The
complete questionnaire is shown in the Appendix.
A follow-up letter was sent as a reminder two weeks after the initial mailing of the
questionnaire, in order to increase the response rate. This technique is strongly
recommended in the "Total Design Method" (TDM) for mailed questionnaires. 1
Five weeks after the first mailing, 32 responses had been received, a 13 percent
response rate. Six questionnaires were returned for change of address, and one was sent
back because the firm was not a construction company, but a tube manufacturing
company.
SLockhart, Daniel C. (Editor); "Making Effective Use of Mailed Questionnaires"; Evaluation Research So-
ciety; 1984
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4.2 Criteria for the Selection of the Surveyed Firms
The firms to be surveyed were selected on the basis of size. The main source used to
determine the names and addresses of the largest construction companies in Mexico was
the 1991 Directory of CNIC Members. 2 The criteria to select the most important firms
from this directory, since it does not include any rankings or annual revenues, was their
registered capital. This is not always a reliable indicator of the size of a firm since some
firms that were established several decades ago still appear with their original capital of
registration. For example, ICA, which is one of the largest firms in Mexico, appears with
a registered capital of only 19,547 new pesos (6,500 U.S. dollars). However, this criteria,
combined with the judgment of the author, was considered suitable for a rough estimate
of the size of the firms.
Around 190 firms having a registered capital of over 1 million new pesos (330,000
U.S. dollars) appear in the CNIC directory. This was considered a reasonable indicator of
a firm being large enough to be included in the survey.
The firms selected from the CNIC directory were complemented with firmnns selected
from a list of Mexico's most important contractors published annually by the "Obras"
magazine.3 The addresses of 78 of the 97 firms listed in "Obras" were obtained from the
CNIC directory. A third source used was a list of 21 Mexican contractors considered the
most important by a journal from the U.S. Department of Commerce called
"Construction Review". 4 Only 7 firms from this list appeared also on the "Obras" list and
just 17 have their addresses included in the CNIC Directory.
2 Directorio de Socios; CNIC; 1991
3 lnforme Anual: Constructoras Perfil 91; Obras; Septiembre 1992
4 The Construction Market in Mexico; Construction Review; July/August 1991
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All these sources represented a total of 246 eligible firms. It is possible that several
important firms were left aside since they do not appear in any of the three sources or
they appear in the CNIC Directory with a small registered capital.
4.3 Characteristics of the Firms
In order to determine the characteristics of the surveyed firms, the first sections of
the questionnaire included five questions to determine the age, annual income, market
segments served, and types of clients of the sampled firms.
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of the firms according to the decade in which they
were established. The largest number of firms, eleven or 37% of the respondents, were
founded between 1970 and 1980. Six firms are more than 30 years old, while only one
respondent was established recently, after 1990.
YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT
AFTER 1990 1
1980 - 1990
1970- 1980
1960 - 1970
BEFORE 1960
Fig. 4.1 Age of the Surveyed Firms
6
11
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0 2 4 6 8 10 1
NUMBER OF FIRMS
2
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Regarding the size of the firms, Fig. 4.2 shows the annual income distribution of the
sample.
Annual income
> N$ 100
(nuevos pesos)
mill.
N$ 10 - 100 mill.
N$ 1 - 10 mill.
N$ 0 - 1 mill.
0 2 4 6 8 10
No. of firms
12 14 16 18
Fig. 4.2 Distribution of firms by annual income
Sixty percent of the firms have an income in the N$10 to 100 million range. CNIC
considers a firm earning more than N$12.5 million per year to be "giant"5 Thus, more
than half of the respondent firms can be considered of large size.
Twenty of the respondent firms are "pure" contractors, that is, they just perform
construction. Nine firms perform both design and construction. Thus, there is
approximately a 70-30 percent distribution of the sample between firms providing only
construction and the ones providing both design and construction (see Fig. 4.3).
5 Revista Mexicana de la Construccidn; CNIC; No. 455; Diciembre 1992
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truction & Design (9 firms)
0%
Only construction (20 firms)
70
Fig. 4.3 Distribution by type of work of sampled firms
Figure 4.4 shows a distribution of the segments of the Mexican construction industry
served by the sampled firms. These segments include: building (commercial,
institutional, residential), housing (housing projects, private residences), industrial
(manufacturing, pharmaceutical, petrochemical), transportation (highways, airports,
railways, seaports), water (distribution, storage dams, canals), environmental (hazardous
waste, water treatment), and communications (telephone lines).
Segments
Building 19
Housing 12
Industrial 15
Transportation 12
Water 10
Power • 3
Environmental 8
Communications 1
0 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20
No. of firms
Fig. 4.4 Segments of the construction market served by sampled firms
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The public/private distribution by type of client reported by the firms on average is
very similar to that considered by CNIC for the whole Mexican construction industry
(see Chapter 1): 71% public and 29% private (Fig. 4.5).
ite
9%
Public
71
Fig. 4.5 Distribution by type of client of sampled firms
4.4 Characteristics of the Market.
In order to determine how Mexican construction firms perceive the competitive
factors of the market in which they evolve, a question based on the five industry forces
model developed by Porter was included. 6 Figure 4.6 depicts how the surveyed firms
rank the effect of these five forces in their market.
6 Porter, Michael E.; "Competitive Advantage"; The Free Press; 1985
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Competitive force
Power of suppliers
Power of buyers
Threat of new entrants
Product substitution
- Rivalry among existing
competitors 8
I I I I I ' I I I ,
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
No effect Strong Effe
Fig. 4.6 Ratings of the effect of the five competitive forces in the Mexican
construction market (average from 30 firms)
The firms perceive the "rivalry among existing competitors" as having the strongest
effect on their market. The "power of suppliers and buyers" ranks next with a
moderately-strong effect. The "threat of new entrants" and the "threat of substitutes"
were rated as having a moderate effect (perhaps a "5" for them means "I'm not sure what
effect it has; I don't think it is strong, but it may have some effect" 7 ). It is my belief that
most of the respondents were not familiar at all with Porter's model, since they did not
appear to understand very well the "threat of substitutes" and the "threat of new entrants"
concepts. It is generally accepted that the construction industry is one where there is no
substitute for its products and services.8 Thus, the rating for this force should have been
one or nearly one. Probably some companies interpreted the threat of substitution of the
SComments by Charles Helliwell, 4/23/93
8Foreign Involvement in U.S. Construction-Related Industries; National Institute of Building Sciences
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products and services they offer as arising from the products and services offered by their
competition. Nevertheless, this kind of competition fits better into the "rivalry among
existing competitors" concept. The same occurred with the "threat of new entrants"
concept. Surveyed firms ranked it somewhat lower than it really is. It is generally
considered that the construction industry is one with low barriers to entry, thus the threat
of new entrants is high. Eugenio Laris, a consultant in Mexico City with a prestigious
career in the public sector, considers that "a unique characteristic of the construction
industry is that you can start from zero and become a successful company, just by having
a good organization and enough capital. With these resources you can compete
successfully against firms with 40 or more years in the business".9 The surveyed firms
probably considered the entrance of new competitors to the construction industry as very
difficult based on the fact that during the 1980's the general economic crisis in Mexico
severely affected this industry. Thus, perhaps the firms considered that potential new
entrants find this sector unattractive and prefer to invest in other sectors of the economy.
The dependency on the public sector was rated as "very serious" (8) on average. The
responses to this question varied from "extremely serious" (10) to "not serious" (1). One
firm added the comment that this dependency is different for each one of the six years
that a presidential term lasts in Mexico. It is important to mention that the high
dependency on the public sector felt by the surveyed firms also stems from the fact that
these companies do the majority of their business with this sector, as seen before.
9 Interview with Ing. Eugenio Laris, 1/8/93
-93 -
A question was included to determine how the firms rate the administration of public
works contracts. Figure 4.7 shows these ratings.
Characteristic
Time to prepare bids
Quality of information
about projects
Flexibility to present
alternatives
Financing options
Dispute arbitration
Timely payments
1 2Very inadequate
9 10
Very adequate
Fig. 4.7 Evaluation of the administration of public contracts (average)
From Figure 4.7 we can conclude that the time to prepare bids was considered
better-than-average in its adequacy, while the administration of public contracts was
considered to have a below-average performance. This result coincides with some of the
weaknesses of the Mexican construction industry described in Chapter 3.
The strengths of Mexican construction companies vis-a-vis foreign competitors
while working in Mexico were also evaluated. Firms gave a somewhat high ranking to all
the potential strengths (Figure 4.8).
e~sa~3
I - - -
Strengths
Knowledge of the public
sector and its practices
Knowledge and experience
with the Mexican labor
Experience with unions in
Mexico
Knowledge and experience
of the legal framework
Relationships with suppliers
of equipment and materials
6 71 2
Not a strength
9 10
Important strength
Figure 4.8 Strengths of Mexican contractors vis-a-vis foreign competitors while
working in Mexico (average)
In the same manner, Figure 4.9 shows the weaknesses of Mexican contractors vis-a-
vis foreign contractors. All were considered more-than-average weaknesses, with the
exception of the high cost of financing and the lack of experience in international
markets which were both rated as somewhat important weaknesses.
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Weaknesses
High cost of financing
Higher tax burden
Excessive red tape
Obsolete construction
technology
Limited access to modem
equipment
Small size doesn't allow
economies of scale
Lack of international
experience
Lack of standardization
Lack of capital investments
Lack of integrated services
1
Not a weakness
2 3 4 52 3 4 5
I I I I I
6 7 8 9 10
Important weakness
Figure 4.9 Weaknesses of Mexican contractors vis-a-vis foreign competitors
(average)
4.5 International Experience.
Only two of 29 respondents to this question reported having experience exporting
construction services (a mere 7% of the total). One of them did not mention the countries
they have exported to, but the other reported exports of electrical construction materials
to Peru for a total of U.S.$5.5 million, in addition to consulting and professional services
to Belize (to the hotel sector) for U.S.$500 thousand. A third respondent reported having
only personal experience in Nicaragua and Honduras.
With regard to the obstacles to entrance into the U.S. construction market, Figure
4.10 shows how the respondent firms ranked the main barriers CNIC believes they will
find while trying to work in the U.S.
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The lack of knowledge of the market and bidding preference laws in the U.S.
represent a moderately-serious obstacle for most construction firms, followed by financial
costs and professional recognition. The remaining barriers were considered average or
near-average obstacles. Several of these barriers, identified by studies done by CNIC, are
not familiar to more than a third of the respondent firms (as indicated in Figure 4.10).
This is obvious since, not having worked in the U.S., these firms have not had the need to
confront these barriers.
Five companies (17% of respondents) reported having faced direct foreign
competition in the past. Four companies reported the competitors or the type of projects;
one did not. One mentioned having competed on railway projects, another reported
having competed on bids against Italian and French companies. Two firms mentioned
both the type of project and competitors: off-shore projects against McDermott, and
energy projects against General Electric.
I I I I
Obstacles
Financial costs
Lack of knowledge of the market
Bidding preference laws
Professional recognition
* Unions
Insurance
Sureties
Dispute resolution
Guarantees of execution and payment
* Licenses and prequalifications
*U. S. Federal Government buying practices
Notification and publicity of job advertisements
*Time limits to respond
* Transparency of bidding procedures
7
78
7
ammuan
56
5
5
5
* Indicates a third or more
"do not know" or blank responses
Not an obstacle Serious obstacle
Fig. 4.10 Obstacles to enter the U.S. construction market (average ratings)
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4.6 Impacts of NAFTA.
A question was included to assess how knowledgeable the surveyed firms are about
NAFTA and the issues affecting the construction industry. They evaluated themselves
with a 6 average (10 being "very knowledgeable" and 1 "no knowledge"). Five
respondents left this question blank. This result gives evidence of how little attention
NAFTA is receiving from Mexican construction companies in general.
The impacts of NAFTA on the overall economy were also evaluated by the surveyed
firms. Many of their responses are probably influenced by the comments the mass media
(TV and press coverage) has been making about NAFTA, since it is my belief that very
few of the respondents have read any serious assessment about the agreement. Figure
4.11 shows the average ratings given by the respondent firms to the potential impacts of
NAFTA in the overall economy.
Saturation of Mexican market
with US prodm.,• t• 7
Increase in foreign competition
Growth of employment in
Mexico
Several small firms will
disappear
Benefits for Mexican consumers
Mexican firms will become more
productive
More access to foreign
investments
Increase in wages for Mexican
workers
More strict enviro
regulationr
Access to larger
'8
8
8
8
9
nmental
markets 7
I t I I I i i -- - - -I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Unlikely to happen Very likely
to happen
Fig. 4.11 Impacts of NAFTA on the Mexican Economy (average ratings)
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The firms considered an increase in efficiency and productivity, and more access to
foreign investments as the most likely consequences of NAFTA. The rest of the potential
impacts were considered to have a moderate possibility of happening, except for "an
increase in wages for Mexican workers", which was considered the less-likely to happen
impact.
Figure 4.12 displays the segments of the Mexican construction market that surveyed
firms feel are the most attractive to U.S. firms.
Seqment
n,,;iuB n 1 9g
Housing
Industrial
Transportation
Water
Power
Environmental
N
23
23
23
I I I I I
0 5 10 15 20 2
No. of surveyed firms considering segment attractive to U.S. companies
Fig. 4.12 Segments of the Mexican construction industry most attractive to U.S.
construction firms
23 firms, or nearly 80%, considered the industrial, power, and environmental
segments of the industry to be the most attractive to U.S. firms. This may be explained
because projects in these segments are usually complex and tend to require higher levels
of design and construction technology, or are of such a scale or under such time
constraints that high levels of construction management skill are required. 10 Mexican
I
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contractors believe that these segments will be attractive to U.S. construction firms since
usually technical expertise is the primary consideration in awarding a contract for these
kinds of projects, and U.S. companies have broad construction project experience in
overseas markets, higher levels of engineering technology, and effective project
management skills.11 U.S. firms have an outstanding record of performance in
managerial efficiency and project management systems that help keep major projects on
or ahead of schedule. They also have special expertise in many design and construction
areas, including very large-scale plants (petroleum and other process plants, utility plants,
power plants, pharmaceutical, and other chemical plants), air and water pollution control
systems, tunnel and subway engineering and construction, energy-efficient building
design and control systems, very tall buildings, and seismic design.12 Additionally, the
environmental remediation market is almost non-existent in Mexico, so there are no
domestic firms qualified to compete in this market. With the creation of the parallel
accords on the environment proposed by U.S. President Clinton before the
implementation of NAFTA, some sites needing clean-up are likely to be detected in
Mexico, giving U.S firms ample opportunities to participate in an area where they are
recognized world leaders.
19 firms, or 66% of the total, also considered transportation as an attractive segment
for U.S. firms. Less attractive were the building and water segments, with only 9 firms
(30%) anticipating U.S. direct competition potential. Housing was considered the less
attractive segment for U.S. firms, with only 7 surveyed firms or 24% considering it. One
to"0 'A Competitive Assessment of the U.S. International Construction Industry"; U.S. Department of Com-
merce; International Trade Administration; February 1989
l Op. Cit.
12 Op. Cit.
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reason for this may be that these segments usually include low-technology projects that
can be easily undertaken by Mexican firms.
Based on CNIC studies, a question regarding possible impacts of NAFTA on the
Mexican construction industry was included. Figure 4.13 shows how surveyed firms
ranked these possible effects.
It can be seen that most of these potential impacts were considered as "likely" to
"moderately-likely" to happen. Mainly, the effort to minimize operation and maintenance
costs of the finished facility, the absorption of new technologies, and the need to train
human resources, were considered as the most likely consequences of NAFTA on the
Mexican construction industry.
4.7 Strategies for Competing in a New Market.
Previous sections of this chapter have reviewed how Mexican construction
companies rate the market in Mexico, the extent of their international experience, and the
impacts NAFTA is likely to have on the overall Mexican economy and on the
construction sector in particular. This section discusses how Mexican construction
companies think they should prepare themselves in order to maximize their benefit from
NAFTA.
Figure 4.14 displays the ratings of the major areas in which firms feel they should
prepare themselves. As can be seen, increasing their financing capabilities was
considered the most important area of preparation. The other areas were all considered of
significant importance.
I I I I I I I I I I I
More orientation to satisfy client
requirements
More attachment to international standards
More attention to quality and execution time
of projects
Look to minimize operation and maintenance
costs
Absorption of new technifogies
Need to train human resources
Growth in demand from the private sector
More competition from foreign firms
Mexican firms will specialize in market niches
Less cost on imported equipment from the
U.S.
a
a
a u, , 7
i- -i i I I1
Fig. 4.13 Potential impacts of NAFTA on the Mexican construction industry
(average)
1
Very unlikely
to happen
I
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Very likely
to happen
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Human resources
U.S. laws and regulations
Modern construction
technology and equipment
Increase financing
capabilities
Search for new markets
I.9~~B
I I I I I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not Extremely
important important
Fig. 4.14 Areas for preparation before the implementation of NAFTA (average)
Regarding the desirability to implement specific strategies, six non-exclusive options
were included in the questionnaire. Three of these options are based on Porter's three
generic competitive strategies. 1 3 These strategies are: cost leadership, differentiation, and
focus. Other strategies included were to protect themselves against foreign competitors,
to form strategic alliances with foreign firms, and to expand to international markets.
Figure 4.15 shows how the respondent firms ranked these strategies.
Strategy
Specialize in market niches
Form means of protection
against foreign competitors
Form strategic alliances with
foreign firms
Expand to international markets
Produce with lower costs
Differentiate products and/or
services to make them more
i i i i
1 2 3
Undesirable
5 6 7 8 9 10
Extremely
desirable
Fig. 4.15 Desirability of Strategies (average)
13 Porter, Michael E.; "Competitive Advantage"; The Free Press; 1985
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Becoming a low cost producer was almost unanimously considered an extremely
desirable strategy to follow. I believe that one of the reasons for this is that respondents
were more familiar with this concept than with the others. Differentiation and the
formation of strategic alliances were also considered very desirable, followed by
focusing in market segments (specialize in market niches). An expansion to international
markets and the formation of means of protection against foreign firms were considered
the least desirable strategies.
A question was included to review how firms classify the advantages and
disadvantages of joint-venturing with foreign firms (see Figure 4.16). 14 Joint-ventures,
consortia, and other cooperative arrangements are becoming more and more important in
international markets. 15 Construction firms from developing countries frequently rely on
joint-ventures and licensing agreements with firms of developed countries that have
experience with advanced construction technologies and in competing on projects that
require special expertise. 16 In other cases, international contractors seek joint ventures
with local firms or other foreign partners in order to take advantage of their knowledge of
local conditions and contacts to gain access to less expensive labor, additional project
financing, or a specific technical skill. 17 Some industry observers estimate that about half
of all current international construction business is undertaken by consortia.18
14The advantages and disadvantages from joint venturing were taken from: Dominguez, Luis M.; Master's
Thesis; Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering; Massachusetts Institute of Technology
15 "A Competitive Assessment of the U.S. International Construction Industry"; U.S. Department of Com-
merce; International Trade Administration; February 1989
16 Op. Cit.
17 Op. Cit.
I8s Op. Cit.
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Advantages
Less financial requirements
Easier entry to market
Risk sharing
Maintain organizational
flexibility
k~.
I I I I I I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not an
advantage
Disadvantages
Requires mutual trust
Requires complementarity
of firms
Differences in organizational
culture
Threat of partner to
become a competitor
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not a Important
disadvantage disadvantage
Fig, 4.16 Advantages and Disadvantages of Joint-Venturing with Foreign Firms
Important
advantage
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As can be seen, less financial requirements and an easier access to the partner's
market were considered somewhat important advantages, while risk sharing and the
maintenance of organizational flexibility were considered moderate advantages.
Regarding the disadvantages of joint-venturing, the differences in organization and
culture were considered the most important disadvantage, even though not a critical one.
4.8 How to Implement a Strategy.
In order to be able to plan and implement a strategy, an adequate period of time is
required. Figure 4.17 shows what period of time is considered the most adequate for the
surveyed firms.
Time-frame
Immediate 1
1 year 2
2 - 5 years 16
6- 10 years 8
11 - 15years 0
Other 1 (20 years)
Do not know 2
0 5 10 15 20
No. of firms
Fig. 4.17 Adequate time frame to prepare the Mexican construction industry for
NAFTA
More than half of the respondent firms considered a period of 2 to 5 years adequate
to become more competitive, while 8 firms (27%) considered a period of 6 to 10 years
more adequate.
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The firms gave an average rating of 8 to the idea of receiving support and incentives
from the Mexican government to facilitate the transition to a more competitive
environment. Ratings on government involvement varied from 1 (definitely do not agree)
to 10 (definitely agree). Thus, there is a general desire to receive moderate support from
the government. In the U.S. Department of Commerce's publication "A Competitive
Assessment of the U.S. International Construction Industry", a series of examples of
government support to domestic construction firms from developed and developing
countries are given, such as subsidies, tax deductions, and protection from foreign
competition, among others.
The firms rated the desirability of different strategies, but what about the obstacles to
the implementation of these strategies? Figure 4.18 shows how surveyed firms rated three
obstacles to the implement of a strategy.
Obstacle T
Financial burden
Lack of organizational
flexibility
Lack of support from the
public sector
II I
1 2 3 4 5
Not an
obstacle
6i6
6
7 8
8
9 10
Serious
obstacle
Fig. 4.18 Obstacles to implement a strategy
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Once again, the financial burden was considered the most serious obstacle, while the
lack of both organizational flexibility and support from the public sector were considered
average obstacles.
4.9 General Comments.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, CNIC is the main source of information about the formal
construction sector in Mexico. It was created in 1953 as a means to protect the
contractors' interests, as well as to form a trade association to overlook issues of mutual
concern, and to develop training and research programs. How effective is this chamber
considered by the surveyed firms? They gave it a grade of 5 on a scale from 1
(ineffective) to 10 (extremely effective). Thus, Mexican contractors feel that CNIC has
played a mediocre role in protecting their interests.
At the final part of the questionnaire, three open questions were included to allow the
surveyed companies to add further comments. Figure 4.19 shows areas in which these
firmns feel that they should invest more time, energy, and/or money, and figure 4.20
shows the reverse: areas in which they are investing too much of these resources. Figure
4.21 displays the opinion of the firms as to whether NAFTA is going to represent an
important change in the way they do business or not, and in which areas there is going to
be a greater change.
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Area
Training
Research and development
Improve construction
technology
Increase efficiency
Marketing
Improve equipment
Specialize in niches
Current jobs
Strategic alliances
increase quality
Financial health
Diversify
Planning
2
2
~1
~1
=1
1 2 3 4 5
No. of firms
6 7 8 9 10
Fig. 4.19 Areas in which surveyed firms feel they should spend more time, energy,
and/or money.
Area
Trying to get paid
Preparing bids
Looking for work
Red tape
Get financing
Public relations/attention to
clients
Marketing
Inefficiencies
Inadequate human
resources
Obsolete equipment
Overhead costs
3
k\1111 82
~1
~1
~1
0 1 2 3 4 5
No. of firms
6 7 8 9 10
Fig. 4.20 Areas in which surveyed firms feel they now spend too much time, energy,
and/or money
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NAFTA will represent an
important change
NAFTA will not represent an
important change
More competiton
Alliances
Less cost of financing
More efficiency
NAFTA will favor foreign
firms
increased foreign presence
Need to increase quality
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
No. of firms
Fig. 4.21 Degree to which NAFTA will represent a change for surveyed firms
Figure 4.19 reveals that a third of the companies considered the training of their
human resources as the single most important area in which they should invest more
time, energy, and/ or money. Research and development, and the improvement of the
construction technology they currently use (both areas very related) followed in
importance. The need to increase the efficiency of their operations and to improve their
marketing efforts was also considered by several firms. Other areas were also mentioned,
although just by one or two firms.
From figure 4.20 it can be observed that trying to get paid by their clients and
preparing bids are thought to be tasks that consume too much time, energy, and/or money
for these firms. Following as resource-consuming tasks were: looking for work, excessive
red tape from the government, and getting financing. It is interesting to notice that
marketing was considered by a couple of firms as an area that gets excessive attention,
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while in figure 4.19 it was observed that this area was considered by four firmnns as one
needing more attention.
In figure 4.21 it can be seen that more than half of the companies (16) feel that
NAFTA will represent an important change, while only five companies think that the
agreement will not represent a big difference in the way the construction industry now
functions. Some firms mentioned areas in which they feel there will be important changes
with the implementation of NAFTA (Figure 4.21).
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Chapter 5. Conclusions and Recommendations.
While this was being written, NAFTA was involved in a process of evaluation by the
legislatures of the three countries. It is expected that, if everything goes as planned,
NAFTA will be implemented by January 1st. 1994.
In previous months, NAFTA has been receiving a lot of attention from the mass
media. This has created awareness and concern among different citizen groups and labor
organizations from the three countries. They fear that NAFTA will negatively impact
worker rights and the environment. In contrast, big business interests have been diligent
supporters of the agreement. They have readily recognized the opportunities that will
unfold as a result of NAFTA and are eager to expand their markets.
Academic and research institutions have conducted countless studies and reports on
the potential impacts of NAFTA on the economies of the three countries. Their forecasts
of GNP growth, employment generation, and import/export variations (among other
economic indicators), with and without a NAFTA, differ enormously. This makes it
evident that since there is no precedent for such an agreement, it is extremely difficult to
generate an accurate forecast of NAFTA's potential effects on the economy.
However, some challenges and opportunities that NAFTA represents for particular
industries can be determined. This might be helpful for each particular sector of the
economy to pursue a desirable strategy. For the Mexican construction industry NAFTA
represents the challenge of more intensive competition from U.S. firms, which have
traditionally dominated the international construction market. On the other hand, NAFTA
represents several opportunities for Mexican construction firms. Increased foreign
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investment in Mexico will stimulate the construction of industrial and commercial space
throughout the country. In addition, infrastructure upgrading is already taking place and
will continue growing under NAFTA with the need to equalize road and water quality
standards (and others) among the three countries.
A growing construction market in Mexico will undoubtedly attract the attention of
U.S. international construction firms. NAFTA will further reinforce this interest by
lowering trade barriers and making most construction materials and equipment readily
available, thus, making procurement more efficient.
5.1 What strategies should Mexican construction companies follow?
The integration of the North American economies will create a need to increase the
competitiveness of Mexican construction firms at an international level. There is a trend
of the E/C industry toward becoming much more globally-oriented, applying more
information technology, developing a wide range of financial capabilities, and providing
special services in the environmental market. 1
Another current trend of the intemrnational construction industry is that it is becoming
a much more knowledge intensive industry. This creates the need to upgrade construction
education and skills development at all levels of the industry. 2
The survey presented in Chapter 4 indicates that some of these factors are actually
issues of concern to Mexican construction companies. This concern is enhanced by the
potential impact NAFTA might have in the Mexican economy.
1 Moavenzadeh, Fred; "A Strategic Response to a Changing Engineering and Construction Market"; World
Economic Forum; April 1989, Japan
20 Op. cit.
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Internationalization:
The need to develop international building standards, the necessity of developing
new markets outside the home country, and the need to accede to knowledge and
technology available in industrialized nations, among other reasons, make
internationalization a very important issue for most construction firms. Surveyed
Mexican firms identified a lack of knowledge of the market, preference for local
contractors, professional recognition, and the financial cost of expanding their operations
as important obstacles to entrance into a foreign market (specifically the U.S. market). A
way to lessen these obstacles is to form strategic alliances with firms from the country
whose market wants to be penetrated.
Joint-ventures:
The formation of joint-ventures and strategic alliances with U.S. firms might give
Mexican firms access to sophisticated technical and managerial expertise. The transfer of
technology and experience while working with U.S. contractors would be an extremely
valuable asset. On their part, Mexican contractors can provide their knowledge of the
Mexican market as well as their relationships with suppliers, and cheaper skilled labor.
Surveyed firms gave higher ratings to the advantages than to the disadvantages of joint
venturing. Less financial requirements and easier entry to the partner's market were
ranked as the most important advantages, followed by risk sharing and the conservation
of organizational flexibility. The only somewhat important disadvantage perceived by
Mexican firms was the cultural differences between firms from both countries.
Some Mexican companies have already started long-term strategic alliances with
U.S. firms(see Chapter 3). Other firms should learn from their experience and follow the
same path.
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Training;
According to the survey, training was considered as the single most important area in
which Mexican construction firms should spend more time, energy, and/or money.
Upgrading the skill development of labor and human capital is a must if any kind of
competitive advantage is to be gained. These efforts must include improved education in
construction engineering and management as well as incorporation of the latest
technologies.
Financing:
Firms in the U.S. have identified competitive financing as the primary factor in
determining success in bidding for international contracts, particularly contracts for
conventional design and construction projects. In order to win contracts, construction
firms are being forced to put together a financing package for the customer.3
The arrangement of financing packages for potential contracts increases overhead
and the cost of bidding for international construction firms. Industry observers estimate
that arrangement of financing packages accounts for 50 to 75 percent of a firm's effort to
sell a project.4
The survey provides evidence that Mexican construction firms have already
perceived the importance of providing their clients with a wide range of financial
capabilities. Unfortunately, the financing of public projects in Mexico was rated as below
average in adequacy. In addition, the high cost of financing was considered, together with
the lack of international experience, as the most important weakness of Mexican
contractors vis-a-vis foreign competitors.
3 U.S. Department of Commerce; "A Competitive Assessment of the U.S. International Construction Indus-
tty"; International Trade Administration; February 1989
4 Op. cit.
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Increasing their financial capabilities was ranked by the surveyed firms as the single
most important area for preparation before the implementation of NAFTA. This will
make the need to closing ties with world financial markets extremely important if firms
wish to remain competitive.
Low cost, differentiation, and focus:
Regarding Porter's generic strategies, the surveyed firms gave an unanimous "10" to
becoming low cost producers. Mexican firms intuitively are aware that this is where their
source of a sustainable competitive advantage resides. The difference in labor and human
capital costs between Mexico and the U.S. remains immense. The Mexican minimum
wage is one 8th to one 10th of that in the U.S. On average, a design engineer in the U.S.
receives eight times the salary of a similar engineer in Mexico, despite the fact that the
cost of living in both countries does not maintain the same proportion.5
Differentiation was also considered a desirable strategy by Mexican construction
companies. In order to differentiate their products and services, Mexican construction
firms must build a reputation based on achieving excellence in quality. Of course, this is
not an easy thing to accomplish and will require a joint effort from all the involved
participants at the government, industry, and firm level to overcome all the structural
weaknesses of the Mexican construction industry described in Chapter 3.
Focusing into market niches also was seen as desirable by the surveyed firms. The
increased segmentation of the construction market into more sophisticated products will
lead to a reversal of the market competitive forces of the Porter model in favor of firms
developing proprietary knowledge through research and development 6
5 Colegio de Ingenieros Civiles de MExico; "La Ingenieriz Civil Mexicana y el Tratado de Libre Comercio
con E.UA. y Canadd"; 1991
6 Moavenzadeh, Fred; "A Strategic Response to a Changing Engineering and Construction Market"
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In summary, NAFTA is likely to stimulate the growth of the Mexican construction
industry. NAFTA will represent significant challenges and opportunities for Mexican
firms. The majority of these firms anticipate that NAFTA will present radical changes in
the way they do business. If the construction industry reacts in a timely, ordered, and
organized manner, it is very possible that NAFTA will act as a motivation to improve the
efficiency and productivity of the whole sector. A better construction industry will help
to improve the economy of Mexico and, thus, the standard of living of all Mexicans.
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Appendix
This appendix presents the cover letter and the questionnaire used for the survey.
COVER LETTER
Cambridge, Massachusetts, February 25, 1993
To: Leading Mexican Construction Companies.
From: Pedro Luis Benftez Malvido, candidate for the degree of Master of Science in
Civil Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dear Contractor:
I am enclosing with this letter a questionnaire that has been sent to you and other 200
Mexican construction companies. I kindly request your participation in this survey,
whose objective is to obtain information that will benefit the Mexican construction
industry. This survey is done under the context of my graduate Thesis at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I give you thanks in advance and I guarantee you
the absolute confidentiality of your answers.
The title of my Thesis is "An Evaluation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement and its Effects on the Mexican Construction Industry" and its objectives are
the following:
1.- Diagnose the present situation of the Mexican construction industry.
2.- Analyze the elements of NAFTA affecting directly the construction industry.
3.- Determine the challenges and opportunities that the opening of the markets in the
three countries represent for Mexican construction firms.
4.- Propose strategies at the government, industry, and firm level to increase the
competitiveness of Mexican construction firms vis-a-vis U.S. and Canadian firms.
The recent conclusion of the negotiations and the signing of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by the presidents of Mexico, Canada, and the United
States represents an important step towards the creation of the largest free trade zone in
the world, encompassing 362 million consumers and a joint GNP of 6 trillion dollars.
Currently the agreement is being evaluated by the legislatures of the three countries and
once passed it will be implemented on January 1st. 1994.
The purpose of the Agreement is to gradually reduce to zero the import tariffs on
products from the three member countries in ranges from immediate for some products to
15 years for the most sensitive products. Additionally, the Agreement will facilitate the
transit of business people and professionals from the three countries.
The new opportunities that NAFTA opens for the Mexican construction industry, as
well as the challenges represented by a competition enhanced by the increased
participation of U.S. and Canadian firms in the Mexican construction market, make
NAFTA an important issue for all individuals related in some form to the construction
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industry. Additionally, the compromise made by the administrations of President Salinas
and President Clinton to increase and upgrade the infrastructure of their respective
countries, represents unique opportunities for construction firms in both nations. This will
require from Mexican firms to be more competitive at international levels to support the
development of our country.
If possible, I would greatly appreciate the questionnaire to be sent to me in the
enclosed envelope as soon as possible. If you have any questions please call me to (617)
621-9551 in the United States or (5) 562-0589 in Mexico. If you feel uncomfortable
answering any specific question, leave it blank. If you like to add further comments in
any particular questions, please feel free to do it. You may remain anonymous, but if you
wish to continue participating in this research, you can include your name and address in
the provided space.
Once again, I am very grateful for your time and interest and I expect to hear from
you soon.
Very truly yours
Pedro Luis Beni'tez Malvido
Center for Construction Research and Education
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
QUESTIONNAIRE
NAFTA and the Mexican Construction Industry Survey
a) If you feel uncomfortable answering any question, please do not stop and continue
with the following question.
b) If you like to add comments to any particular question, please feel free to do it.
Characteristics of Your Company:
1.- When was your company established?
Before 1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 After 1990
2.- What is the size of your company?
Gross revenues (in nuevos pesos): N$0-1 mill. N$1-10 mill. N$10-100
mill. >N$100 mill.
3.- What does your company do?
Construction and design (architecture and/or engineering) Only construction
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4.- What segments of the construction market does your company serve?
Building_ Housing_ Industrial Transportation Water
Power Environmental
5.- How are your total sales distributed according to the type of client?
Public Sector
Private Sector
100%
Characteristics of the Mexican Construction Market:
In the rating questions please use any number from 1 to 10 (1, 2, 3, 4, etc.).
6.- Please rate the following factors as to their effect on the competitiveness of your
market:
(10=strong effect, 1=no effect, 0=do not know)
Power of the suppliers of materials and labor to affect your costs
Power of buyers to bargain down your price or choose an alternative company_
Threat of entry of new companies
Availability of substitutes to the services you offer (other than construction firms)
Industry rivalry for market share
7.- How serious do you consider is the dependency of the Mexican construction
industry on the Public Sector?
(10=extremely serious, 1 =not serious, 0=do not know)
8.- How do you rate the following characteristics of the administration of public
contracts in the particular case of your company?
(10-very adequate, 1=very inadequate, 0=do not know)
Time to prepare bids
Quality of the information provided about the projects
Flexibility to present alternatives
Financing of the projects
Dispute arbitration
Time to pay
9.- How do you rate the following strengths of your company vis-a-vis your foreign
competitors?
(10=important strength, 1 =not a strength, 0=do not know)
Knowledge of the public sector and its administrative practices
Knowledge and experience on the Mexican labor market
Experience with unions in Mexico
Knowledge and experience with the legal framework
Relationships with suppliers of materials and equipment
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10.- How do you rate the following weaknesses of your company vis-a-vis your foreign
competitors?
(10O=important weakness, 1=not a weakness, O=do not know)
High cost of financing and limited access to long term credits
Differences in the real fiscal burden with respect to foreign competitors
Excessive red tape due to regulations and government practices
Obsolete construction technology___ Limited access to modem equipment
Small size that does not allow the acquisition of economies of scale
Lack of experience in international construction
Lack of standardization Lack of capital investments
Lack of "turn-key" services
International activities:
11.- Does your company has experience exporting construction to other countries?
Yes No
12.- If yes, please mention the countries to which your company has exported
construction and the type and value of the projects.
13.- What do you consider the main obstacles for your firm in particular to enter into
the U.S. market?
(10=serious obstacle, 1--not an obstacle, O=do not know)
Financial costs
Lack of knowledge of the market
Laws and regulations favoring local companies
Recognition of professions
Unions
Insurance Sureties
Dispute resolution
Guarantees for execution and payment
Licenses and prequalifications
Buying practices from the U.S. Federal Government
Lack of notice and publicity of job advertisements
Time limits to respond
Transparency of bidding procedures
14.- Have you faced direct competition from an U.S. or Canadian firm in the past?
Yes No
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15.- If yes, can you name the companies with whom you have competed and the kinds
of projects?
Impact of NAFTA:
16.- How knowledgeable are you about the contents of NAFTA and especially those
affecting the construction industry?
(10O=extremely knowledgeable, 1=not knowledgeable, O=do not know)
17.- How do you rate the following potential impacts and consequences of NAFTA in
the overall Mexican economy?
(10=very likely to happen, 1=unlikely to happen, O=do not know)
Saturation of the national market with U.S. products
Increased competition from foreign firms
A large number of Mexican medium and small firms will go out of business
Growth of employment in Mexico
Mexican consumers will be greatly benefited
Mexican firms will turn much more productive and efficient
Increased access to foreign investment
Increased wages for Mexican workers
More strict enforcement of environmental regulations
Access to new and larger markets
18.- In which segments do you think that U.S. construction firms will most likely come
to compete?
Building Housing_ Industrial Transportation Water
Power Environmental
19.- How do you rank the following potential consequences of the aperture of the
construction industry with NAFTA?
(10=very likely to happen, 1 =unlikely to happen, O=do not know)
More orientation towards satisfaction of client requirements
Construction more close to international standards
More attention not just to cost but also to quality and execution time
Finished products will look to minimize costs of operation and maintenance
Absorption of new technologies
Need to train human resources in new technologies and practices
Growth in demand share from the private sector
Increased competition from international firms
Specialization on market niches for Mexican construction firms
Lower costs on equipment and materials imported from the U.S.
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Strategies to Cope with a New Market:
20.- What do you consider are the most important areas in which Mexican
construction companies have to prepare themselves in order to make the
implementation ofNAFTA the most beneficial possible?
(10=extremely important, 1=not important, 0=do not know)
Human resources U.S. laws and regulations
Modem construction technology and equipment
Increase financing capabilities Search for new markets
21.- How do you rank the desirability of the following strategies to compete, once
NAFTA is implemented, in the particular case of your company?
(10=extremely desirable, 1--not desirable, 0=do not know)
Specialize in market niches
Form means of protection against foreign competition
Form alliances and joint ventures with foreign firms
Expand to international markets
Become the lower cost producer
Differentiate your products to make them more valuable to the client
22.- How do you rate the advantages and disadvantages ofjoint-venturing with foreign
firms?
Advantages (10=important advantage, 1=not an advantage, 0=do not know)
Lower financial requirements Easy access to market
Sharing of risks Maintains flexibility of the organization
Disadvantages (10=important disadvantage, 1=--not a disadvantage, O=do not
know)
Requirement of mutual trust (common set of goals and objectives)
Requires complementarity between firms
Organizational and cultural differences
Threat of partner to become a competitor
How to Implement your Strategy?:
23.- What do you consider an adequate period of time to overcome the principal
deficiencies of the Mexican construction industry and enable it to compete
internationally?
Immediate 1 year 2-5 years 6-10 years 11-15 years Other
(specify)_ Do not know_
24.-Do you think that the Mexican government should provide incentives and aid to
Mexican construction firms in order to facilitate the transition to a more competitive
environment?
(10=definitely agree, l=definitely do not agree, 0=do not know)
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25.- How do you rate the following obstacles to implement a particular strategy in your
company?
(10= serious obstacle, 1=--not an obstacle, 0=do not know)
Financial burden Lack of organizational flexibility_ Lack of support from
the public sector
General:
26.- How effective do you think CNIC has been to protect the contractors interests?
(10=extremely effective, l=ineffective, 0=do not know)
27.- Mexican construction firms should spend more time, energy, and/or money in...
28.- Mexican construction firms now spend too much time, energy, and/or money in...
29.- Finally, do you think that NAFTA will represent an important change in the way
to do business in the Mexican construction industry, or it will not really present a big
difference?
You may contact me again
Name of company
Address of company
Name and title of respondent
Phone Number
Best times to call
I would like to continue participating in the research: Yes No
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